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Game of Thrones:
Liberty & Eminent Domain
MITCHELL F. CRUSTO *
This Article analyzes the relationship between private
property and the government’s power to expropriate it.
When it comes to protecting private property from governmental expropriation, our Constitution is conflicted. On the
one hand, the right to private property is a foundational
principle that defines the American spirit, our history, and
our culture. Yet, on the other hand, the Founders adopted
the government’s superior authority over private property,
that is, eminent domain, for public purpose and with just
compensation, via the Takings Clause of the Fifth
The Henry F. Bonura, Jr. Professor at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, Yale Law School, J.D., 1981; Oxford University (Marshall Scholar),
England, B.A., 1980, M.A., 1985; Yale University, B.A. The author is especially
grateful to my colleagues of the John Mercer Langston Black Law Professors Organization and to Loyola law students Lindsey Freihoff, Mary Claire Kramer, Jillian Morrison, Laurel Taylor, and Emily Torrey. Special thanks to my life partner,
and wife Lisa, who, in addition to being a great C.P.A., is an equally great proofreader. Thanks to Loyola Law School for financial support through a research
grant and research assistance provided through the generosity of the Henry F. Bonura, Jr. Family, the Alfred T. Bonomo, Sr. Family, and the Rosario Sarah LaNasa
Memorial Fund. This Article is one in a trilogy that examines a person’s rights to
own and control the attributes of themselves. See Mitchell F. Crusto, Right of Self,
79 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 533 (2022) (advancing the position that everyone has an
inherent, fundamental right to the attributes of self) [hereinafter Right of Self];
Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as State Property: Valuing Critical Race Theory,
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (utilizing Critical Race Theory to
explain how the American legal system has denied Black people, specifically
young Black men, the right to acquire property) [hereinafter Blackness as State
Property]. These articles are components of a broad project to critically analyze
the constitutionality of the law’s treatment of people and their attributes as property. See generally Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status,
and Wealth, 1 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 51 (2005) (focusing on Black women’s struggle for property rights) [hereinafter Blackness as Property].
*
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Amendment. This “private property conundrum” requires us
to explore the limits of eminent domain relative to a person’s
private property right in themselves, that is, their “persona.”
This Article advances the thesis that every person in
America possesses a right to the attributes of themselves or
“persona,” which is protected against governmental exploitation. It develops that seminal, normative thesis through
three tasks: (1) it presents a contemporary conflict between
the private property rights of National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”) athletes and state governments that
operate NCAA schools; (2) it argues that eminent domain
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should not
apply to persona rights, particularly name, image, and likeness (“NIL”); and (3) it proposes a model code solution that
society, policymakers, and government should adopt to prohibit the use of eminent domain to exploit NIL and other attributes of persona. Consequently, this Article concludes
that States that operate NCAA member schools have wrongfully taken, and continue to wrongfully take, student athletes’
right to their persona.
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INTRODUCTION
A.
The Battle
In 2019, Chase Young was the star football player for The Ohio
State University Buckeyes. 1 During his junior season, Mr. Young
broke the school’s single season sack record, 2 earned a unanimous
First-Team All-American nomination, 3 and received yet another defensive player of the year award. 4 However, in November 2019, Mr.
Young was suspended from play “due to a possible NCAA 5 issue
1

See Demand that the U.S. Congress Guarantee Fair Pay for College Athletes in Every State, COLOR OF CHANGE, https://act.colorofchange.org/sign/congress_fairpay?source=coc_main_website (last visited Feb. 24, 2022) (reporting
several awful stories of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (“NCAA”)
mistreatment of Black athletes, including Chase Young).
2
Tom VanHaaren, Chase Young Sets Buckeyes’ Single-Season Sacks Record, ESPN (Nov. 23, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/
id/28147511/chase-young-sets-buckeyes-single-season-sacks-record.
3
Wyatt Crosher, Ohio State’s Chase Young and Jeff Okudah Are Unanimous First-Team All-Americans, BUCKEYE SPORTS BULL. (Dec. 19, 2019, 4:00
PM), https://www.buckeyesports.com/ohio-states-chase-young-and-jeff-okudahare-unanimous-first-team-all-americans/.
4
The awards included the Bronko Nagurski Trophy, Chuck Bednarik
Award, Ted Hendricks Award, Chicago Tribune Silver Award, Nagurski-Woodson Defensive Player of the Year Award and the Smith-Brown Defensive Lineman of the Year. Mr. Young was also named the Big Ten Athlete of the Year and
was a finalist for the Heisman Trophy. See Associated Press, Ohio State’s Chase
Young Wins Nagurski Award, ESPN (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/28263055/ohio-state-chase-young-wins-nagurski-award;
Chase Young 2019 Wins Chuck Bednarik Award, OHIO STATE UNIV. (Dec. 12,
2019), https://ohiostatebuckeyes.com/chase-young-wins-2019-bednarik-award/;
Jarrod Clay, Chase Young Wins 2019 Ted Hendricks Award, ABC 6 (Dec. 11,
2019), https://abc6onyourside.com/sports/the-football-fever/chase-young-wins2019-ted-hendricks-award; Teddy Greenstein, Chase Young Is the 2019 Chicago
Tribune Silver Football Winner, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/college/ct-chase-young-ohio-state-silver-football-2019120
6-imh2o6cs45cpdbj5e7b7sla4zu-story.html.
5
See National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Sept.
14, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Asso
ciation (noting the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is an organization formed in that regulates college athletics); see also What Is the NCAA?,
NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/10/about-resources-media-centerncaa-101-what-ncaa.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2022) (reporting that, as of March
2021, the NCAA was composed of “[n]early half a million college athletes [who]
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from 2018 that the Department of Athletics [was] looking into.” 6 In
2018, Mr. Young had borrowed money from a family friend to purchase an airline ticket for his girlfriend to attend the prestigious Rose
Bowl in Pasadena, California. 7 By the time Mr. Young was suspended in November 2019, he had already repaid the loan. 8 Despite
this, the NCAA claimed that by taking the loan Mr. Young had violated the NCAA amateurism rules 9 (hereinafter “rules”) and
make up the 19,886 teams that send more than 57,661 participants to compete
each year in the NCAA’s 90 championships in 24 sports across 3 divisions.”).
6
Diamaris Martino, Ohio State’s Star Football Player Suspended for Accepting Loan, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/08/ohiostates-star-football-player-suspended-for-accepting-loan.html (reporting on a
statement made by Ohio State’s Associate Athletics Director).
7
Jordan Heck, “Free Chase Young”: Criticism of the NCAA Trends on Social Media After Ohio State Star’s Suspension, SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/chase-young-suspensionohio-state-ncaa/arx41omz2l47191iwyw5ju398.
8
Id.
9
“Amateurism rules” or “eligibility rules,” for purposes of this Article, refer
to the body of NCAA rules, under which college teams are only allowed to compensate their athletes with scholarships that cover the costs of attending school.
Moreover, under its amateurism rules, the NCAA, inter alia, prohibits college
athletes from contracting for the use of their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”),
thereby assuming and benefiting from its sole control of their NIL. See NCAA
DIVISION I MANUAL 64–77 (NCAA, 1998) (setting forth the amateurism and athletics eligibility requirements including: (1) Athletes will lose their amateur status
and become ineligible for NCAA play if he or she is compensated for his or her
athletic skills in that sport; (2) an NCAA member institution or affiliate is permitted to use the physical appearance, name, and pictures of a student-athlete for both
charitable and educational purposes; (3) a student-athlete will lose his or her ability to participate in NCAA sporting events if he or she either accepts or received
payment from through commercial advertisement, promotion, or endorsement);
see also Anastasios Kaburakis et al., Is It Still “In the Game”; or Has Amateurism
Left the Building? NCAA Student-Athletes’ Perceptions of Commercial Activity
and Sports Video Games, 26 J. SPORT MGMT. 295, 297 (2012). At the time of
Chase Young’s violation, the NCAA required that its members adopt its policies
on college student athlete compensation, called amateurism rules. Essentially,
these rules do not allow for compensation for NCAA athletes. The policy provides
that while in high school or secondary school, prospective student-athletes may
promote or endorse a commercial product or service, provided they do not receive
any compensation for doing so, “[h]owever, after student-athletes enroll at an
NCAA school, they may no longer promote or endorse a product or allow their
name, image or likeness to be used for commercial or promotional purposes.”
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ultimately suspended him for two games, which likely caused him
to lose his bid for the highly-coveted Heisman trophy. 10
Mr. Young could have avoided that unfortunate episode if he
had owned his name, image, and likeness (“NIL”). 11 However, the
NCAA and particularly its member school, The Ohio State University, had prohibited Mr. Young from capitalizing on his NIL, 12
thereby denying him the fruits of his property rights. 13 To maintain
(emphasis added) Promoting or Endorsing Commercial Products or Services,
NCAA (July 2019), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_ceter/ECMIP/Amateurism_Certification/Promoting_Endorsing_Commercial_Products_Services.pdf.
10
See Bruce Hooley, Ohio State’s Justin Fields, Chase Young 3-4 in Heisman
Voting, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/ohiostate/football/ohio-states-chase-young-justin-fields-watch-burrow-win-heisman
(reporting the Young lost the Heisman bid to Joe Burrow); Josh Planos, Ohio
State’s Chase Young Is Playing like a Heisman Contender, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ohio-states-chase-young-isplaying-like-a-heisman-contender/.
11
As an award-winning player, on a top college football team, Mr. Young
could have had the funds available by way of advertising and promotional deals
in order to purchase tickets for his friends or family to see him play at the Rose
Bowl. In fact, one study shows that NCAA college football stars could be earning
as much as $2.4 million per year. See Tom Huddleston Jr., College Football Stars
Could Be Earning as Much as $2.4 Million Per Year, Based on NCAA Revenues:
Study, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/02/howmuch-college-athletes-could-be-earning-study.html; see also Tommy Beer,
NCAA Athletes Could Make $2 Million a Year if Paid Equitably, Study Suggests,
FORBES (Sep. 1, 2020, 1:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommy
beer/2020/09/01/ncaa-athletes-could-make-2-million-a-year-if-paid-equitablystudy-suggests/?sh=db877045499f.
12
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13
Aside from his NIL rights, Mr. Young was entitled to just compensation
for the value of his labor as a player. This is the subject of a companion piece,
entitled, Blackness as State Property, supra note *, which analyzes the legal history of the government’s support of the taking of the labor of young Black men.
Some critics have likened the NCAA’s exploitation of its players with the enslavement of Black people or of Black labor during the era of Jim Crow. While
this is a powerful analysis due to the number of Black male athletes who are negatively impacted by the NCAA amateurism rules, that is not the focus of this Article. See Brandi Collins-Dexter, NCAA’s Amateurism Rule Exploits Black Athletes as Slave Labor, ANDSCAPE (Mar. 27, 2018), https://andscape.com/features/ncaas-amateurism-rule-exploits-black-athletes-as-slave-labor/; Jay Connor,
The NCAA Is Big Business for Everybody but Black Players, THE ROOT (Nov. 15,
2019, 12:30 PM), https://www.theroot.com/the-ncaa-is-big-business-for-
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their amateur status, student athletes were strictly forbidden from
receiving funds or support from sources outside of NCAA member
schools. 14 By limiting student compensation and restricting their
rights to their NIL, the NCAA and its member schools, which include “public” schools that are owned by States, received billions of
dollars from their sports programs, mainly in the form of advertising
and television media. 15
everybody-but-black-player-1839890040; Brando Simeo Starkey, College Sports
Aren’t like Slavery. They’re like Jim Crow, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 31, 2014),
https://newrepublic.com/article/120071/ncaa-college-sports-arent-slavery-theyre
-jim-crow. Moreover, college sports, particularly football, can be especially dangerous to the physical health and wellbeing of the students. Numerous players
have sued the NCAA for its handling of concussions. See Associated Press, Former Football Players Sue NCAA over Concussions, USA TODAY (Sept. 4, 2013,
12:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/09/04/formerfootball-players-sue-ncaa-over-concussions/2762575/; see also Dr. Edward M.
Wojtys, The Dark Side of College Football, 10 SPORTS HEALTH, 489, 489 (Oct.
24, 2018) (“[Thirty-four] NCAA football players have died during football activities in the past [eighteen] years; [twenty-seven] nontraumatic deaths were reported in 2017, while [six] players died from trauma to the head or neck over the
same time period.”).
14
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15
See Eliott C. McLaughlin, California Wants its College Athletes to Get
Paid, but the NCAA Is Likely to Put Up Hurdles, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/01/us/california-sb206-ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act/
index.html/ (“With the signing of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, Gov. Gavin
Newsom acknowledges he is picking a fight—and he think he’ll win . . . . The act
allows the state’s college athletes to monetize their name, image, and likeness,
and sign endorsement deals and licensing contracts . . . . Exactly what the act entails monetarily is unclear, but Newsom says the law is about rebalancing a power
structure in which NCAA universities receive more than $14 billion annually and
the nonprofit NCAA receives more than $1 billion, ‘while the actual product, the
folks that are putting their lives on the line, putting everyone on the line, are getting nothing.’”); Dan Murphy, California Defies NCAA as Gov. Gavin Newsom
Signs into Law Fair Pay to Play Act, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27735933/california-defies-ncaa
-gov-gavin-newsom-signs-law-fair-pay-play-act (comparing the restrictive
NCAA rule to California’s Fair Pay to Play Act); Tom Goldman, College Athletes
in California Can Now Be Paid Under Fair Pay to Play Act, NPR (Sept. 30,
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/30/765834549/college-athletes-in-california-can-now-be-paid-under-fair-pay-to-play-act (“Newsom explained why the
Fair Pay to Play Act was important . . . . ‘It’s going to change college sports for
the better by having now the interest, finally, of the athletes on par with the interests of the institutions.’”).
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In addition to being denied their NIL rights, the benefits collegiate athletes received from their play have been grossly inadequate,
especially compared to that of professional athletes. 16 Under the
NCAA amateurism rule, its players are restricted to school granted
benefits, such as scholarships, 17 which are often insufficient 18 to
meet a student’s basic needs. 19 Hence, the NCAA, its member
schools, and its member State governments, have received substantial financial benefits from taking the private property of their student athletes.
Following years of litigation, 20 the inequitable treatment of
NCAA athletes received national public attention. That litigation
culminated in two major developments: (1) in September 2019, the
State of California enacted legislation permitting NCAA college
athletes to capitalize on their NIL and not lose their amateur status

See Huddleston Jr., supra note 11; Paying College Athletes—Top 3 Pros
and Cons, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.procon.org/headlines/pay
ing-college-athletes-top-3-pros-and-cons/.
17
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
18
See Paying College Athletes—Top 3 Pros and Cons, supra note 16 (“College athletes are required to make up the difference between NCAA scholarships
and the actual cost of living. Tuition shortfalls amount to thousands of dollars per
year which leave about 85% of players to live below the poverty line . . . . About
25% of Division I athletes reported food poverty in the past year and almost 14%
reported being homeless in the past year. Erin McGeoy, a former water polo athlete at George Washington University, explained, ‘a common occurrence was that
we would run out of meal money halfway through the semester and that’s when I
started to run into troubles of food insecurity.’”).
19
In fact, eighty-six percent of NCAA college athletes live below the poverty
line. Armstrong Williams, Time to Pay College Athletes, NEWSMAX (Apr. 9, 2014,
7:47 AM), https://www.newsmax.com/ArmstrongWilliams/NCAA-college-athletes-nlrb/2014/04/09/id/564508/. These students are usually required to live on
campus, attend offseason workouts, and travel to games all over the country.
Therefore, they often require additional financial support beyond the scholarships
allowed by NCAA rules. For example, how are they supposed to eat after the
school cafeterias are closed when their only meal ticket applies to onsite schoolsponsored meals? In addition to the lack of general financial support, being a college athlete comes with the inherent danger of injury. All of these factors place
not only a financial burden but also an emotional and psychological strain on college athletes, especially players of color.
20
See infra Part I.
16
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with the NCAA; 21 and (2) in 2021, the Supreme Court, in NCAA v.
Alston, 22 handed down a landmark ruling on “Fair Pay to Play.”23
Following the California legislation and the Alston decision, several
States have enacted laws that permit college athletes to capitalize on
their NIL. 24 Consequently, these developments prompted the
NCAA to adopt interim rules effective as of July 1, 2021 to reconcile
the various State laws. 25
In September 2019, California passed the Fair Pay to Play Act, which becomes effective in 2023 and will allow students to have more control over their
names and likenesses for sponsorship and endorsement purposes beyond those
sanctioned by the NCAA. S.B. 206, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see
McLaughlin, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2155 (2021) (holding that while the
NCAA could regulate its players compensation, restrictions on that compensation
would be subject to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis and the
ordinary rule of reason’s fact-specific assessment of their effect on competition);
see also infra Part I.
23
“Fair Pay to Play,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the legal issue of
the right of college athletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness while
maintaining their amateur status with the NCAA. It is often referred to simply as
“Pay to Play,” although that phrase is also used for a variety of situations in which
money is exchanged for services or the privilege to engage in certain activities,
particularly in reference to political corruption. See infra Part I.
24
See Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation by State, BUS. OF
COLL. SPORTS, (April 1, 2022), https://businessofcollegesports.com/trackername-image-and-likeness-legislation-by-state/ (reporting that as of April 1, 2022,
twenty-six states’ pro-NIL laws are now in effect, including Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas).
25
See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and
Likeness Policy, NCAA (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/ncaa-adopts-interim-name-image-and-likeness-poli
cy (“The policy provides the following guidance to college athletes, recruits, their
families and member schools: [1] Individuals can engage in NIL activities that are
consistent with the law of the state where the school is located. Colleges and universities may be a resource on state law questions. [2] College athletes who attend
a school in a state without an NIL law can engage in this type of activity without
violating NCAA rules relating to name, image and likeness. [3] Individuals can
use a professional services provider for NIL activities. [4] Student-athletes should
report NIL activities consistent with state law or school and conference requirements to their school.”). The NCAA’s interim rules make no mention of gambling
21
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As a result of these changes, NCAA athletes are now allowed to
capitalize on what was previously being taken from them by the
government, both directly and indirectly through the NCAA. This is
a major financial benefit to those players. 26 Current estimates are
that this new market for college athletes will be worth $500 million
in the first year and $1 billion annually thereafter. 27 Going forward,
some highly marketable college athletes are expected to become instant millionaires, and even lesser known ones have a chance to cash
in. 28 Notwithstanding, players’ apparent unfettered access to this
businesses or other vice industries as being prohibited. See Interim NIL Policy,
NCAA, http://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_InterimPolicy.pdf (last
accessed Feb. 26, 2022); see also Zach Braziller, NCAA Changes College Sports
Forever: ‘An Entirely New Landscape’, N.Y. POST (June 30, 2021, 8:56 PM),
https://nypost.com/2021/06/30/ncaas-new-nil-rule-changes-everything/
(“The
guidelines are: [1] Deals cannot serve as recruiting inducements. [2] Athletes cannot receive benefits without services given. [3] Agents or representation are allowed for NIL benefits. [4] Schools cannot be involved in creating opportunities
for their athletes. [5] Players cannot promote alcohol, legal drugs like cannabis,
tobacco products, adult entertainment or gambling.”).
26
See AJ Maestas & Jason Belzer, How Much Is NIL Worth to Student Athletes? ATHLETIC DIRECTOR U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/how-muchis-nil-really-worth-to-student-athletes/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2022) (“[F]rom a licensing standpoint, the annual NIL value per student-athlete could range from
$1,000–$10,000, whereas professional athletes garner between $50,000–
$400,000 for the same group usage licenses . . . . When applied to Instagram followers for college athletes from the 2019-2020 school year, annual endorsement
revenue estimates would be $700,000 for LSU’s Joe Burrow, $440,000 for Alabama’s Tua Tagovailoa, $390,000 for Oklahoma’s Jalen Hurts, and in the $5–30K
range for less popular athletes.”).
27
See Justin Birnbaum & Olivia Evans, College Athletes Are Ready to Reap
the Rewards of a Billion-Dollar NIL Market. Opendorse Is Here to Help, FORBES
(|June 24, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaevans/2021/
06/24/college-athletes-are-ready-to-reap-the-rewards-of-the-billion-dollar-nilmarket-opendorse-is-here-to-help/?sh=6b969b2c4f57; see also Colin Dwyer,
NCAA Plans to Allow College Athletes to Get Paid for Use of Their Names, Images, NPR (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/29/
774439078/ncaa-starts-process-to-allow-compensation-for-college-athletes (reporting that the NCAA is making over $1 billion annually largely through marketing fees and TV rights from its most prominent sports and various events).
28
See Braziller, supra note 25 (highlighting the endorsement deals signed by
student-athletes the day after the NCAA rule change); see also Bill Bender, NIL
Tracker: Which College Athletes Are Signing Endorsement Deals? SPORTING
NEWS (July 1, 2021), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/nil-
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money-making opportunity faces some restrictions with these new
laws, such as how to integrate their NIL rights with the intellectual
property interests, such as uniforms and logos, of their school. 29
B.
A Profound Issue of Private Property Rights
The NCAA players’ victory over their NIL rights raises a quintessential jurisprudential question: Does eminent domain permit the
government to expropriate the attributes of a person’s self, particularly their name, image, and likeness? 30 This Article tackles that
question by analyzing the relationship between private property
rights and eminent domain.
Relative to the government’s power to take a person’s private
property, the Constitution is a precious gemstone with a dangerous,
hidden flaw. On the one hand, fundamental and constitutional principles recognize a person’s private property rights. While, on the
other hand, the Constitution grants the government supreme authority—eminent domain—to take people’s property, for public use and
subject to just compensation. 31 This requires us to raise the vexing
question, does eminent domain supersede our libertarian right to
own and control our private property?
This Article answers that question by contending that a person’s
property right in attributes of themselves or “persona,” 32 particularly
tracker-college-athletes-signing-endorsement-deals/appbna8md69i1s65pvrwra
938 (tracking endorsement deals signed by student athletes).
29
Murphy, supra note 15 (noting that the state laws contain varied restrictions on how student athletes can make money). Furthermore, there is still the
issue of fairly compensating the students for their participating in playing the
sports. Id. (“Most new state laws and the NCAA rule explicitly prohibit schools
from paying athletes directly for the use of their NIL or for any other purposes.”
(emphasis added)).
30
There is the related question, whether the right to capitalize on one’s NIL
is merely a privilege that some States have granted to NCAA players or if it is a
fundamental right that belongs to everyone? See Right of Self, supra note *.
31
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
32
“Persona,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the “natural property”
rights endowed in each and every person, encompassing a person’s attributes or
identity, such as labor, name, image, likeness (“NIL”), and other unequivocal
identifiers. It can be defined as the intersection of personal rights and property
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NIL, should be absolutely protected from governmental 33 taking, 34
thereby completely eliminating the government’s eminent domain
powers 35 under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment from
rights. Persona, moreover, is a right that a person is fundamentally, constitutionally, statutorily, or otherwise entitled to, including, but not limited to the right of
privacy, the right of publicity, the right to be free from enslavement, in all mediums such as print, online, fantasy, metaverse, and the virtual universe. “Attributes,” for purposes of this Article, include a person’s labor, their brand, and a
quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something. For purposes of this Article, persona has two major components: (1) labor
and (2) NIL. This Article focuses on NIL which incorporates the right of personality. While persona is related to the right of personality and the right of publicity,
it is much broader than both legal concepts. See infra Part III. Compensation for
students’ actually playing the sport, that is, their labor, is another important aspect
of persona as evaluated in this Article.
33
The terms “government” or “governmental,” for purposes of this Article,
refers to all levels and aspects of the federal, state, and local authorities, as well
as “agents” of the government, private individuals, organizations, and government
“sponsored” entities who receive government support or benefits including antitrust protection, non-profit status, and the like, such as that of the NCAA. The
author views the NCAA as governmental because it is a nonprofit entity and many
of its members are State-owned schools (colleges and universities) that operate
with the approval and consensus of the citizens of a State. See Division I—Finances, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/5/4/finances.aspx#:~:text=As
%20a%20nonprofit%20organization%2C%20the,the%20classroom%20and%20
throughout%20life (last visited April 2, 2022) (purporting that the NCAA is a
nonprofit organization); see Directory—Active Members, NCAA, https://web3.
ncaa.org/directory/memberList?type=1 (last visited April 2, 2022) (listing all active member schools in NCAA). This categorization highlights the question that
if persona, particularly NIL, is the property of the student athletes, then when a
State where the athlete is enrolled takes that property, and without just compensation, is that a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, as well as a in violation of some State Constitutions? See, e.g., LA
CONST. art. 1, § 4 (“Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy,
protect, and dispose of private property . . . . Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with
just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.”).
34
“Taking(s),” for purposes of this Article, refers to instances “when the government seizes private property for public use”, with just compensation, pursuant
to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Legal Info. Inst., Takings,
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/takings (last visited Mar. 30,
2022) [hereinafter Takings]; see also infra Part I.
35
The term “eminent domain,” for purpose of this Article, is defined as a
governmental taking of property. An eminent domain action typically is applied
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taking a person’s NIL. 36 This Article develops that thesis through
three tasks. Part I presents a case study analysis of whether the
NCAA’s amateurism rules constitute a “wrongful” taking of the
property of its student athletes. 37 Part II argues that eminent domain
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment should not apply to
persona rights, particularly NIL, and that the law should prohibit any
and all governmental takings of persona. 38 Part III proposes a model
code solution that governments should adopt to prohibit the use of
eminent domain to exploit NIL and other attributes of persona. 39
C.
A Game of Thrones 40
Before I move forward with that endeavor, I want to explain
three reasons why protecting persona rights from governmental taking is an important concept worthy of exploration. First, persona is
the new property. It is especially valuable to younger Americans and

to real property (real estate, including buildings and land), but any kind of property may be taken if done within the legal confines of the law (based on the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause). See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-domain (last updated Jan. 24, 2022).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also supra note 31. The Fifth Amendment applies to the States through the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Legal
Info. Inst., Incorporation Doctrine, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine (last visited Mar. 30, 2022) (“The incorporation doctrine is a constitutional doctrine through which the first ten amendments
of the United States Constitution (known as the Bill of Rights) are made applicable to the state through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
see generally Janet Thompson Jackson, What Is Property? Property Is Theft: The
Lack of Social Justice in U.S. Eminent Domain Law, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 63,
64 (2010) (contending the social justice is non-existent in eminent domain law).
37
See infra Part I.
38
See infra Part II.
39
See infra Part III.
40
“Game of Thrones,” for purposes of this Article, refers to a battle for control of people’s attributes or persona, including their labor and NIL, between parties with unequal bargaining positions. It reflects on the lessons learned from the
popular, American fantasy drama television series, particularly how the quest for
greed and power in a lawless society needlessly destroys people’s lives and
dreams.
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is the focus of what I refer to as “Right of Property.” 41 Second, developing persona as an absolute property right addresses wealth inequity between the young and the old in this country. 42 Third, reinvigorating libertarian principles into our laws can promote social
justice. 43
First, persona is a growing area of intellectual property. NCAA
athletes are not the only people who should be protected from governmental taking of their personal property. With the development
of modern technology, including the expansion of the virtual or
metaverse, 44 property interests in attributes of one’s self, such as
NIL, have increased in value and, therefore, are subject to greater
exploitation. 45 For example, consider the financial value of an avatar
in a fantasy football league. 46 Rights to NIL are of particular interest
“Right of Property,” for purposes of this Article, refers to “private” property, owned by private individuals, not government, both tangible or intangible,
reflecting the libertarian principles of John Locke and the Founders of the United
States. See infra Part II; see also infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. See
Right of Self, supra note *.
42
See infra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
43
See infra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
44
“Metaverse,” for purposes of this Article, refers to the virtual environment
of the internet and anything associated with the Internet and the diverse Internet
culture. See DAVID BELL ET AL., CYBERCULTURE 41–43 (2004).
45
Persona is not limited to name, image, and likeness, but includes less visible attributes of an individual, such as their DNA, which, with medical technology
such as gene splicing and stem cell development, raises legal issues over the ownership rights of a voluntary or involuntary donor. For example, the “HeLa cell
line” is among the most important scientific discoveries of the last century and
was established in 1951 from a tumor taken from Henrietta Lacks. See REBECCA
SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS 51–52 (2010); see also
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990) (holding
that Moore had no property rights to his discarded cells or to any profits made
from them; however, that the research physician had an obligation to reveal his
financial interest in the materials that were harvested from Moore, who could thus
bring a claim for any injury that he sustained by the physician’s failure to disclose
his interests).
46
The nature of property interests in one’s persona are still being developed.
There is much at stake as technology continues to monetize the “virtual” essence
of a person. See Dora Mekouar, Why Millions of Americans Spend Billions on
This Fantasy, VOICE OF AMER. NEWS (Sept. 3, 2019, 11:42 AM),
https://www.voanews.com/a/usa_all-about-america_why-millions-americans-sp
end-billions-fantasy/6175070.html (reporting that, in 2019, the fantasy sports industry was worth over $7 billion).
41
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to millennials, Generation Z, and Generation A who are currently
living off the fruits of their persona, due to the proliferation of social
media. For example, a nineteen-year-old influencer Josh Richards
made nearly a thousand dollars a minute as a TikTok star. 47 While
these cultural facets of intellectual property are both timely and important, this Article focuses on only one type of property interest in
persona—NIL rights. 48
Further, persona is personal and private. Imagine one morning
you receive a text message from your best friend. She tells you a
new “character,” who looks and talks just like you, has been added
to a popular video game. 49 Upon investigation, you discover that
someone has taken your image without your permission and has licensed it to a game developer, 50 and, moreover, that the government
has sanctioned and benefitted financially from the taking of your
47
See Jade Scipioni, Here’s How Many Social Media Followers You Need to
Make $100,000, CNBC (May 20, 2021, 6:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/
2021/04/30/how-much-money-you-can-make-off-social-media-following-calculator.html; Raktim Sharma, How Do Influencers Make Money on Instagram?, YAHOO! FIN. (Mar. 31, 2021), https://ca.sports.yahoo.com/news/how-do-influencers-make-money-through-instagram-083707019.html (discussing how influencers use their persona as branding to influence marketing, promotional, and affiliate deals).
48
These unexplored attributes of persona have legal aspects that have been
widely undeveloped by our legal system. See, e.g., Shaw Fam. Archives Ltd. v.
CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that
neither New York nor California has a right of publicity applicable to a decedent);
Michael Decker, Goodbye, Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Publicity’s Transformation at Death, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 252 n. 69,
253–54 n.77 (2009) (noting that many states now have common law and/or statutory rights of publicity that apply postmortem).
49
Juventus footballer Edgar Davids brought a lawsuit against Riot Games
Europe Holdings Ltd, stating that a player named Lucian in their League of Legends game infringed Davids’s likeness. Monika A. Gorska & Lena MarcinoskaBoulange, Likeness in Computer Games: Real-Life People, NEWTECH.LAW (Apr.
8, 2021), https://newtech.law/en/likenesses-in-computer-games-real-life-people/.
Similarly, Booker T. Huffman sued Activision, claiming that the Call of Duty
character David “Prophet” Wilkes is based upon a character he appeared as in the
early days of his wrestling career named G.I. Bro. Andy Chalk, Activision Smacks
down Pro Wrestler Booker T. in Call of Duty Copyright Lawsuit, PC GAMER (June
25, 2021), https://www.pcgamer.com/activision-beats-pro-wrestler-booker-t-incall-of-duty-copyright-lawsuit/.
50
Id. In each of the above cases, the game developers used the person’s likeness in their video game without their permission.
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image. This battle over persona is not new and is a very real problem, which compels us to assess a person’s private property right in
their NIL. That is the goal of this Article.
Second, the NCAA athletes’ controversy should be public concern because it further highlights the need to address wealth inequity, 51 especially at the intersection of age, race, gender, and class. 52
This inequity results from a conscious and unconscious transfer of
wealth from young people, 53 of both their nonvirtual and virtual

51
See Matthew Yglesias, New Federal Reserve Data Shows How the Rich
Have Gotten Richer, VOX (June 13, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/6/13/18661837/inequality-wealth-federal-reserve-distributional-financial-accounts (“[T]he rich have gotten richer and inequality has grown[.]” In fact,
the Federal Reserve data indicates that from 1989 to 2019, wealth became increasingly concentrated in the top 1% and top 10% and that the gap between the wealth
of the top 10% and that of the middle class is over 1,000%; and increases another
1,000% as compared to the top 1%, hence the term “wealth gap.”).
52
See, e.g., Vanessa Williamson, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap Requires
Heavy, Progressive Taxation of Wealth, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/closing-the-racial-wealth-gap-requires-hea
vy-progressive-taxation-of-wealth/ (“The median white household has a net worth
10 times that of the median Black household . . . . The total racial wealth gap,
therefore, is $10.14 trillion.”).
53
See Christopher Ingraham, The Staggering Millennial Wealth Deficit, in
One Chart, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/03/precariousness-modern-young-adulthood-one-chart/ (“[Millennials’] financial situation is relatively dire. They own just 3.2 percent of the nation’s wealth. To catch up to Gen Xers, they’d need to triple their wealth in just
four years. To reach boomers, their net worth would need a sevenfold jump.”).
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selves, 54 to upper-class, white adults. 55 I refer to this phenomenon
as “intergenerational wealth displacement.” 56 One example of a
nonvirtual, inequitable transfer of wealth is the high debt load that
many students pay for college, graduate, and professional schools
and its subsequent negative impact on their quality of life. 57

54
This “exploitation” includes the lawful and unlawful commercial use of
virtual or digital images, data, and information, referred to as “personally identifiable information,” usually by big business or government. See Christos Giakoumopoulos et al., Handbook on European Data Protection Law, E.U. AGENCY
FUNDAMENTAL RTS., 29–31 (2018), https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
fra_uploads/fra-coe-edps-2018-handbook-data-protection_en.pdf
(protecting
data rights among EU Member States for individuals, strengthening mandated
data protection requirements, and imposing significant legal responsibilities on
entities handling personal data). No similar protections exist in U.S. law, except
for the State of California’s California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). See Office
of the Attorney General, California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) Fact Sheet,
CAL. DEP’T OF JUST. (2019), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/attach
ments/press_releases/CCPA%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2800000002%29.pdf).
55
Parenthetically, this Article will also shine light on the unconscious cause
of systemic racism. That focus is explored in Blackness as State Property, supra
note *. “Systemic racism,” or “institutional racism,” for purposes of this Article,
refers to the conscious and unconscious institutionalization of and the continuation of the oppression of Black people. See STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES
V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (Vintage Books 1992 ed. 1967) (“[Institutional racism] originates in the operation of
established and respected forces in the society, and thus receives far less public
condemnation than [individual racism].”).
56
“Intergenerational wealth displacement,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as legal and illegal, conscious and unconscious, transfer of wealth from
younger Americans, particularly those from disadvantages communities, to
adults, particularly wealth, senior, white males, as one dynamic that resulted in an
aged-related wealth gap. Households headed by people aged sixty-five or older
are forty-seven times wealthier than households where the median age is thirtyfive years or younger. See Annalyn Censky, Older Americans Are 47 Times
Richer
than
Young,
CNN
(Nov.
28,
2011,
3:09
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2011/11/07/news/economy/wealth_gap_age/index.htm.
57
Censky, supra note 56 (“Some of those trends come hand in hand with
more young people attending college, which can be a double-edged sword. While
those college credentials could lead to income gains for many young people down
the road, surging tuition costs are also leaving them burdened by more student
loans than prior generations.”).
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Third, reinvigorating libertarian 58 or natural law 59 principles
into our civil laws 60 can promote social justice. This point is a personal one and explains my motivation for writing this Article. Years
ago, in preparing for my first class at Yale Law School, I reflected
on the hollowed words of Oliver Wendell Holmes 61: “The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.” 62 I was both
“Libertarian view,” for purposes of this Article, means to strongly value
individual freedom and civil liberties, endorse a free-market economy based on
private property, and freedom of contract. See Libertarianism, STAN. ENCYC. OF
PHIL. (Jan. 28, 2019), (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism/; see also
Individual Rights, LIBERTARIANISM.ORG, https://www.libertarianism.org/topics/
individual-rights (last visited Mar. 23, 2022) (“[L]ibertarian doctrines of individual rights are often cast in terms of a fundamental right of self-ownership.”). This
Article reflects libertarianism based on deontological ethics—the theory that all
individuals possess certain natural or moral rights, mainly the right of “individual
sovereignty” or “self-ownership,” which is a property in one’s person, with possession and control over oneself, as they exercise over the possessions they own.
See infra Part II; see generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
42–43 (2013 ed. 1974) (defending a political theory entrenched in the rights of
individuals); DAVID BOAZ, THE LIBERTARIAN MIND 27 (2015); G.A COHEN,
SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY 15 (1995).
59
“Natural law” or “natural law theory of property,” for purposes of this Article, is defined as the jurisprudential theory by which there are “natural rights”
(1) that are fundamental or natural, as derived from God or nature, (2) to which
all people are equally entitled, (3) that are inalienable, meaning they cannot be
bargained or legislated away from people, and (4) that apply to life, liberty, and
property. See The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (May
26, 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/; see Natural Law,
FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/natural+law.
60
See infra Part II. Parenthetically, this Article focuses on the civil rights
protections of these laws, recognizing that they also protect liberty, in the form of
rights against criminal infringements. That is not to exclude the fundamental right
of privacy. See Legal Info. Inst., Publicity, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/publicity (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (“In the United States,
the right of publicity is largely protected by state common or statutory law. Only
about half the states have distinctly recognized a right of publicity. Of these, many
do not recognize a right by that name but protect it as part of the Right to Privacy.”); Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, https://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Mar. 1, 2022) (indicating that “a statute is not a prerequisite for the Right of Publicity to be enforceable” as a number of states have
an enforceable Right of Publicity by way of common law).
61
See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.,
409, 424–26 (2000) (identifying Holmes as the third-most cited American legal
scholar of the 20th century).
62
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
58
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bewildered and disappointed by those words. Bewildered that my
chosen field of study seemed pedantic, and disappointed by
Holmes’s view of law being devoid of the search for a higher purpose, such as justice or the betterment of humanity. Subsequently,
over twenty-five years of teaching law, I have found many law students share my thirst for using law as a means to achieve social justice. Consequently, this Article is written to challenge Oliver Wendell Holmes’s view of the law. I believe that the “life of the law” has
been and should be the quest to protect individual rights from governmental infringement. 63 As such, this Article seeks to establish a
constitutional and jurisprudential basis for positive social change.
Hence, I believe that there is a void in the development of civil
liberties that will redress wealth inequities. 64 This requires a transformational development in our understanding of our rights. Such a
development could promote the growth of new markets for intellectual property generated through the often-virtual world of the
metaverse. 65 The dire need for that development is presented next
through a case study relating to the NIL rights of college athletes.
D.
Sports as a Window into Culture & Values
Before we present that case study, it is appropriate to explain
why the battle over college student athletes’ rights to control their
NIL is vital to exhibit the transformational value of Right of Property. First, sports provide invaluable insight into our culture and values. 66 Second, Justices and other constitutional scholars have

See infra Part II.
Rakim Brooks, The Racial Wealth Gap is a Civil Liberties Issue, ACLU
(Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/news/racial-justice/the-racial-wealth-gapis-a-civil-liberties-issue/.
65
See Tim Chheda, Comment, Intellectual Property Implications in a Virtual
Reality Environment, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 483, 483, 507 (2005)
(predicting a future that we now live in and calling on lawmakers to adjust the
laws with the changes in technology).
66
See Kenneth J. Marci, Not Just a Game: Sport and Society in the United
States, 4 INQUIRIES J. no. 8, 2012, at 1 (“Sport coincides with community values
and political agencies, as it attempts to define the morals and ethics attributed not
only to athletes, but the totality of society as a whole.”).
63
64
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analogized the judicial function in sports terms. 67 And third, Right
of Property as applied to college students is an important example
of intergenerational wealth displacement. 68
In summary, this Article utilizes a libertarian lens to support the
proposition that every person in America possesses a unique type of
natural property 69 right 70 to their persona that should be absolutely
protected from governmental taking, pursuant to the philosophy of
John Locke 71 and the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. 72
Further, it explores the question of whether State governments that
See generally Megan E. Boyd, Riding the Bench—A Look at Sports Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 5 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 245, 246 (2014) (providing insight into the various ways that the court has used sports analogies and metaphors). Chief Justice John Roberts, during his appearance before the Senate Judiciary Committee, once stated: “Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make
the rules; they apply them . . . I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and
strikes and not to pitch or bat.” Id. at 248. Justice Stevens also expressed his frustration on a decision by stating that the majority “punted” on an issue of importance in Morse v. Frederick. Id. at 251.
68
See Rohan Nadkarni, Study: NCAA ‘Robs Predominantly Black Athletes’
of Opportunity to Build Generational Wealth, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31,
2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/31/ncaa-athlete-compensation-costrevenue-study (“The NCAA’s steadfast refusal to pay players is costing its largely
Black labor force an opportunity to create substantial generational wealth.”); see
notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
69
“Property,” for purposes of this Article, is defined using the ambiguous and
sometimes contradictory theories of private property. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 26 (1988); STEPHEN MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 1 (1990); MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 35–36 (1993).
70
See Joshua Getzler, Theories of Property and Economic Development, 26
J. INTERDISC. HIST. 639, 641 (1996) (“[t]here is a notion of property as presocial,
a natural right expressing the rights of persons which are prior to the state and
law, this being the view of Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke,
Immanuel Kant, and George W. F. Hegel; and there is a notion of property as
social, a positive right created instrumentally by community, state, or law to secure other goals—the theory of Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Emile Durkenheim, and Max Weber.”).
71
“[E]very man has Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself.” JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 116 (Rod Hay
ed., McMaster University 1823) (1690).
72
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
67
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operate NCAA member schools have and are wrongfully expropriating student athletes’ NIL rights. Part I next presents a case study
of the NCAA players’ battle for their NIL rights and seeks to answer
that question.
I.

PYRRHIC VICTORY

If you think this has a happy ending, you haven’t
been paying attention. 73
— Ramsay Bolton
That Game of Thrones quote of Ramsay’s sadistic torture of
the captured Theon Greyjoy illustrates two points that are relevant
to the next part of this Article. (1) It shows how individuals often
suffer from lawlessness in society. Being aware of such abuse of
power and in seeking “a more perfect Union,” the Founders of the
United States established a Nation governed by laws, not by power.
Hence, the U.S. Constitution provides a strong framework to protect
individual rights and liberties from lawless struggle for power and
avarice. (2) It warns that what appears to be a happy ending is
merely a prelude to continuing abuse. The lesson here for NCAA
players is the granting of NIL privileges does not end the NCAA’s
continued exploitation of its players.
This Part critically assesses whether the current granting of
NCAA players the ability to capitalize on their NIL is a true victory
for players’ rights. This Part is divided into three sections: First, it
provides a background of the players’ legal struggles to assert their
constitutional rights to be compensated and benefit from their NIL.
Second, it analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Alston 74 and the
subsequent State laws granting NCAA players their NIL rights.
Third, it assesses the NCAA amateurism rules from the perspective
of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clauses to determine whether
those rules constitute a “rightful” or “wrongful” taking.
73
Kim Renfro, 5 Time ‘Game of Thrones’ Has Broken the Fourth Wall, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/game-ofthrones-breaks-fourth-wall-2016-4; see generally Game of Thrones, HBO,
https://www.hbo.com/game-of-thrones (last visited Mar. 5, 2022).
74
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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A.
Battle over NIL
This section describes the history of the NCAA rules that greatly
restricted players’ compensation and denied them the right to capitalize on their NIL. Further, it presents the apparent victory for the
players who, following a landmark Supreme Court decision, are being granted the privilege of benefitting from their NIL but not from
their labor.
Historically, the NCAA rules required that student-athletes who
play for NCAA-member colleges must agree to forego benefiting
from the commercial use of their NIL, as well as other restrictions
on their compensation. 75 This resulted in the NCAA and their university members exploiting substantial financial compensation from
their students, mainly in the form of advertising and television media. 76 In the last several years, these NCAA rules have been under
attack from various sources 77 and the NCAA itself reported that it
was planning to provide a reform. 78 Needless to say, these restrictive
rules have a disproportionate impact on students of color, many of
whom come from impoverished families. 79
To appreciate the battle over NIL, one needs to understand the
history and rationale behind the NCAA’s rules, at least from the
viewpoint of the NCAA—the past and current potential for abuse
when college athletics becomes commercialized. In the Supreme
Court decision NCAA v. Alston, 80 the Court provided a history of
past corruption and gaming that led the NCAA to introduce and continue to enforce these rules. 81 In particular, the Court reported on the
See Stanton McManus, Another NCAA Upset: Rethinking the Playbook for
Compensating Student-Athletes, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO BLOG (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://minnesotalawreview.org/2019/04/23/another-ncaa-upset-rethinking-theplaybook-for-compensating-student-athletes/.
76
See supra Part I.
77
See, e.g., Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation by State, supra
note 24.
78
See Greta Anderson, Court Panel Rules Against NCAA Restrictions on Athlete Pay, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 19, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/05/19/court-panel-rules-against-ncaa-restrictions-athlete-pay (reporting on the NCAA’s process of reviewing its policies related to
how to compensate players for names and likenesses).
79
See supra note 1 (reporting on several awful stories of the NCAA’s mistreatment of Black athletes).
80
See generally NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
81
Id. at 2148–51.
75
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NCAA’s program to address under-the-table pay to players and regulate player compensation. 82 The Court then explained that the rules
regarding student-athlete compensation have evolved ever since, 83
in ways in which the players claim are inadequate, unfair, and inequitable. As a result, the NCAA rules on student compensation eventually permitted payments to include room, board, books, fees, and
“cash for incidental expenses such as laundry”; 84 paid professionals
in one sport to compete on an amateur basis in another sport; 85 and
athletic conferences to authorize their member schools to increase
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance. 86 The NCAA created
the “Student Assistance Fund” and the “Academic Enhancement
Fund” to “assist student-athletes in meeting financial needs,” “improve their welfare or academic support,” or “recognize academic
achievement”; 87 allowed payments “‘incidental to athletics participation,’” including awards for “participation or achievement in athletics” (like “qualifying for a bowl game”) and permitted certain
“payments from outside entities,” such as for “performance in the
Olympics”; 88 permitting its member schools to award up to (but no
more than) two annual “Senior Scholar Awards” of $10,000 for students to attend graduate school after their athletic eligibility expires; 89 and finally, allowing schools to fund travel for student-athletes’ family members to attend “certain events.” 90
At first glance, it appears that the NCAA provides substantial
benefits to its athletes. However, when viewed through the eyes of

Id. at 2149 (explaining that the NCAA “adopted the ‘Sanity Code’” in
1948, authorizing schools to pay for athletes’ tuition, while providing for “suspension or expulsion” of those students who received other forms of compensation).
83
Id. at 2149–50.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. (“In 2018, the NCAA made more than $84 million available through
the Student Activities Fund and more than $48 million available through the Academic Enhancement Fund. Assistance may be provided in cash or in kind, and
there is no limit to the amount any particular student-athlete may receive.”) (internal citations omitted).
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
82
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many of its most sought-after players, 91 one would agree that the
NCAA and its member schools are reaping substantial financial benefits by exploiting the labor and persona of those athletes.
In 2014, in a landmark class-action lawsuit O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 92 numerous college athletes claimed that the NCAA and its
colleges were reaping the profits off their names and likenesses, in
violation of the Sherman Act and antitrust law. 93 The district court
ruled in part for the plaintiffs, and the NCAA agreed to allow student-athletes to receive full scholarships for academics in light of
the use of the students’ names and likenesses. 94 While the college
athletes received some benefits from the O’Bannon decision, the
courts still failed to recognize the students’ property rights in their
NIL. As a result, students continued to challenge the fairness of the
NCAA’s compensation rules.
Following the O’Bannon decision, in 2019, several former
NCAA players filed several lawsuits in federal court, which were
consolidated under NCAA v. Alston, 95 challenging the NCAA restrictions on educational compensation for athletes. 96 In March of
2019, a federal judge ruled that the NCAA restrictions on “non-cash
education-related benefits” violated antitrust law under the Sherman
Act. 97 The court required the NCAA to allow for certain types of
academic benefits beyond the previously-established full scholarships from O’Bannon, such as for “computers, science equipment,
musical instruments, and other tangible items not included in the

See, e.g., Huddleston Jr., supra note 11; Beer, supra note 11.
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
93
Id. at 963. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7, is a United States
antitrust law that prescribes the rules of free competition for those engaged in
interstate commerce. See LEGAL INFO. INST., Sherman Antitrust Act, CORNELL L.
SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sherman_antitrust_act (last visited Apr.
1, 2022).
94
See Hosick, supra note 25; Michael McCann, Why the NCAA Lost its Latest
Landmark Case in the Battle Over What Schools Can Offer Athletes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/03/09/ncaa-antitrust-lawsuit-claudia-wilken-alston-jenkins.
95
See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp.
3d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
96
Id. at 1062.
97
Id. at 1110.
91
92
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cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit
of academic studies.” 98
Moreover, the district court in Alston barred the NCAA from
preventing athletes from receiving “post-eligibility scholarships to
complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school; scholarships to attend vocational school; tutoring; expenses related to studying abroad that are not included in the cost of attendance calculation; and paid post-eligibility internships.” 99 However, the court
held that the conferences within the NCAA may still limit cash or
cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. 100 The court based
the decision on the large compensation discrepancy amongst the
NCAA and the students. 101 The NCAA appealed to the U.S. Ninth
Circuit.
In response to pending litigation and public opinion in favor of
players having control over their NIL, 102 California passed the Fair
Pay to Play Act (S.B. 206), which permits athletes to capitalize on
their NIL for sponsorships and endorsements, free from the NCAA
rules. 103 The new law also prohibits universities from implementing
rules that prohibit student-athletes from earning compensation or
Id. at 1088.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1089.
102
Michael T. Nietzel, Americans Now Overwhelmingly Support College Athletes Earning Endorsement and Sponsorship Money, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:43
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltnietzel/2020/02/11/americans-nowoverwhelmingly-support-college-athletes-earning-endorsement-and-sponsorship
-money/?sh=7c4c8a02648e.
103
S.B. 206, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“[Under S.B. 206] an athletic
association, conference, or other group or organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics, including, but not limited to, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, shall not prevent a student of a postsecondary educational institution
participating in intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as a result of
the use of the student’s name, image, or likeness.”); see also Governor Newsom
Signs SB 206, Taking on Long-Standing Power Imbalance in College Sports, CAL.
STATE PORTAL: OFF. OF GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/09/30/governor-newsom-signs-sb-206-taking-onlong-standing-power-imbalance-in-college-sports/; Gregg E. Clifton & Nicholas
A. Plinio, New Jersey Grants Name, Image, Likeness Rights to Collegiate StudentAthletes, JACKSON LEWIS: COLLEGIATE & PRO. SPORTS BLOG (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://www.collegeandprosportslaw.com/uncategorized/new-jersey-grants-nam
e-image-likeness-rights-to-collegiate-student-athletes/.
98
99
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denying scholarships to athletes who choose to market their NIL. 104
S.B. 206 does not require universities to pay student-athletes themselves; as a result, the net cost to the NCAA and its collegiate members would be zero, as all compensation is paid for by third-party
endorsers. 105 The law seems to be based on an equal protection argument that, relative to benefiting from their NIL, NCAA schools
cannot treat athletes differently from other college students. 106
In May of 2020, the Ninth Circuit ruled on the district court’s
decisions in Alston and upheld its decisions. 107 The Ninth Circuit
noted that the NCAA had a necessary interest in “preserving amateurism and thus improving consumer choice by maintaining a distinction between college and professional sports.” 108 Moreover, the
Court agreed with the district court that the NCAA practices relative
to some specific restrictions violated antitrust law, 109 while Judge
Smith penned a concurrence and likened the NCAA to a cartel. 110
Subsequently, the NCAA started a review of its policies related to
players’ compensation for NIL. 111 However, the NCAA appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court. On March 31, 2021, the Supreme Court
heard arguments in NCAA v. Alston. 112 The centerpiece of this case
See S.B. 206.
Id.
106
For example, while a film major who doesn’t play a varsity sport is permitted to generate income making YouTube videos, a film major who is also an athlete may not. See Billy Witz, A State Skirmish Over N.C.A.A. Amateurism Rules
Has Quickly Become a National Battle, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/sports/ncaa-amateurism-rules.html.
107
In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239,
1244 (9th Cir. 2020).
108
Wolters Kluwer trade report (Trade Reg. Rep. P 81227 (C.C.H.), 2020 WL
3549287).
109
Id.
110
According to Judge Smith, “The treatment of Student-Athletes is not the
result of free market competition. To the contrary, it is the result of a cartel of
buyers acting in concert to artificially depress the price that sellers could otherwise receive for their services. Our antitrust laws were originally meant to prohibit
exactly this sort of distortion.” Id. at 1267 (Smith, J., concurring).
111
See Hosick, supra note 25.
112
NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). This case is an appeal from the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling that affirmed a district court’s March 2019 holding that that
the NCAA’s restrictions on non-cash education-related benefits violated the Sherman Act and, as a result, that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic
104
105
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was the antitrust protection under NCAA v. Board of Regents, 113 as
it relates to the NCAA’s eligibility standards and compensation. 114
As is sometimes the case, a Supreme Court decision’s impact
goes beyond the specific holding of the case. This is true about the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alston. 115 In 2021, Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the lower court’s injunction against the NCAA’s restrictions on players’ compensation. 116 However, the Court explicitly stated that since the studentathletes did not renew their “across-the board challenge to the
NCAA’s compensation restrictions,” 117 the Court’s review was limited to “those restrictions now enjoined.” 118 However, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion, while upholding the NCAA’s power
over the eligibility of its players, noted that “the NCAA’ current
compensation regime raises serious questions under the antitrust
laws.” 119
On the one hand, the Court agreed with the district court’s enjoining of certain NCAA rules limiting the education-related

benefits beyond the previously-established full scholarships. In re NCAA, 958
F.3d. 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).
113
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101, 119–20 (1984) (invalidating
NCAA’s restrictive television licensing scheme under rule of reason standard but
noting that college sports is “an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”).
114
See generally Robert Barnes & Rick Maese, Supreme Court Will Hear
NCAA Dispute Over Compensation for Student-Athletes, WASH. POST (Dec. 16,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-ncaa
/2020/12/16/90f20dbc-3fa9-11eb-8db8-395dedaaa036_story.html (reporting the
NCAA oversees rules related to student athletes that play in their athletics programs, which, inter alia, limit the type of compensation that the school could give
to student athletes as to distinguish college athletics from professional sports, disallowing “non-cash education-related benefits” such as scholarships and internships so that there is no apparent “pay to play” aspects).
115
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2141 (2021).
116
Id.
117
Id. at 2151.
118
Id. at 2162–63 (holding that the district court’s injunction did not invite
future courts to “micromanage” the NCAA, but rather constituted a permissible
antitrust remedy). See generally NCAA v. Alston, 135 HARV. L. REV. 471 (Nov.
10, 2021) (analyzing the antitrust aspects of the majority decision).
119
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

680

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

benefits schools may make available to student-athletes. 120 Yet,
most importantly, the Court advised the NCAA that it could not use
the federal antitrust laws as a justification for its rules regulating
players’ compensation. 121 Specifically, the Court affirmed the district court’s injunction on the NCAA’s restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits.” 122
Equally important is the Court’s dicta on the issue of “pay to
play.” In favor of the players’ position, the Court noted that colleges
have leveraged sports to bring in revenue, attract attention, boost
enrollment and raise money from alumni. 123 The Court highlighted
that the profitability of this sports-driven enterprise relies on “amateur” student-athletes competing under rules that restrict how the
schools may compensate them for their play. 124 This observation is
consistent with the claims brought in this case by former studentathletes that the NCAA rules depress compensation for at least some
Id. at 2166 (affirming the district court’s decisions (1) not to disturb the
NCAA’s rules limiting undergraduate athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic performance, (2) while, at the same time, finding as unlawful and thus enjoined certain NCAA rules limiting the education-related benefits
schools may make available to student-athletes, and (3) as consistent with established anti-trust principles when it subjected the NCAA’s compensation restrictions to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis). Tangentially, this
case shows that, contrary to Alexander Hamilton’s belief that the United States
Supreme Court is the “weakest” branch of government, judicial review can produce profound social, economic, and political outcomes. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
121
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2165.
122
Id. at 2165 (“Under the current decree, the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind
benefits unrelated to a student's actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing
a ‘no Lamborghini’ rule. And, again, the district court invited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules delineating which benefits it considers legitimately related to education. To the extent the NCAA believes meaningful ambiguity really
exists about the scope of its authority—regarding internships, academic awards,
in-kind benefits, or anything else—it has been free to seek clarification from the
district court since the court issued its injunction three years ago. The NCAA remains free to do so today. To date, the NCAA has sought clarification only once—
about the precise amount at which it can cap academic awards—and the question
was quickly resolved. Before conjuring hypothetical concerns in this Court, we
believe it best for the NCAA to present any practically important question it has
in district court first.”).
123
Id. at 2149.
124
Id. at 2144
120
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student-athletes below what a competitive market would yield.125
Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed the NCAA’s rules violate the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspiracies
“in restraint of trade or commerce.” 126 Courts have interpreted the
Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade to prohibit only restraints that are “undue.” 127 For the most part, Courts assess whether
a restraint is undue using the “rule of reason” standard, 128 which requires a fact-finding of market power and structure to decide what a
restraint’s actual effect is on competition. 129
The Court also responded to the NCAA’s argument that its business should enjoy a special exception that excludes it from antitrust
law or at least it be given special leeway under antitrust law. 130 On
this, the Court disagreed, stating that college sports is a trade and,
therefore, cannot unduly restrain athletes from the marketplace. 131
However, this is where the Court relented in its attack of the NCAA.
The Court affirmed the district court’s findings of undue restraints
in certain NCAA rules limiting the education-related benefits
schools otherwise could make available to student-athletes, including paid internships, post-graduate scholarships, tutoring or education abroad. 132 Unfortunately, and perhaps illogically, the Court
failed to rule on the NCAA’s rules limiting players’ education-related benefits. 133 Moreover, the Court expressly stated that it is not
an undue restraint for the NCAA, or conferences within it, to define
what those educational benefits are, 134 leaving the restrictions on
amateur status partially undisturbed.
Hence, the unanimous decision by the Court did not free NCAAmember college athletes from their contractual relationship with
their colleges and universities. On the contrary, the decision was
narrowly tailored to address the issues on appeal, namely, the scope
Id. at 2154.
Id. at 2151 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
127
Id. (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018)).
128
Id. (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
129
Id. at 2151 (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284
(2018)).
130
Id. at 2159.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 2164.
133
Id. at 2147.
134
Id. at 2165.
125
126
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of the antitrust laws as applied to the athletes’ education-related benefits. 135
While the Alston decision is herein regarded as a landmark decision that supports the right for student-athletes to profit from their
NIL, the Court’s Alston decision did not directly answer the question
of whether the NCAA players are legally entitled to their NIL and
whether it is a matter of right, federally protected, rather than a privilege. One interpretation would be that following Alston, NCAA
players are, at best, entitled to the privilege of receiving commercial
compensation from their NIL and still maintain their amateur status.
B.
Unanswered Questions
As a result of Alston, and following California’s pre-Alston
lead, 136 numerous States enacted laws that permit college athletes to
capitalize on their NIL and maintain their amateur status with the
NCAA. 137 These developments prompted changes in the NCAA
rules to comply with the State laws. 138 These statutory changes in
NIL for NCAA players, though not enacted by every State, 139 represent a major financial opportunity for the top college athletes,140
allowing them to enjoy what other students and perhaps every
American enjoys—the right to benefit from their NIL free of governmental taking.
Equally important to the NCAA players’ compensation from
their NIL right, Alston represents an important step forward in the
recognition and protection of a universal right to their NIL. Unfortunately, the Alston Court and the state laws favoring players’ ownership of their NIL raise more questions about the existence of a
property right that players have in their NIL than they answered.
1. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS
The following observations and questions result from an analysis of the current state laws that grant NCAA college athletes control
over the commercial use of their NIL. Those new laws: (1) apply
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id.
S.B. 206, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
See Hosick, supra note 25.
Id.
See id.
See Huddleston Jr., supra note 11; Beer, supra note 11.
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only to collegiate athletes, 141 relative to eligibility rules 142 and are
subject to certain restrictions, 143 which raises the question why the
new laws do not apply universally to all Americans; (2) lack an expressly stated jurisprudential rationale, beyond to protect the players, which raises the question whether the players have a property or
constitutional “right” to their NIL, or if it is merely a “privilege”
granted by the legislature which can be revoked at a later time; (3)
141
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-1762(5) (defining “intercollegiate sport”
as a sport “for which eligibility requirements for participation by a student athlete
are established by a national association for the promotion or regulation of collegiate athletics.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-103(C) (2021) (stating “intercollegiate athletics program” means “an intercollegiate athletics program played at the
collegiate level for which eligibility requirements for participation by a studentathlete are established by a national association for the promotion or regulation of
collegiate athletics”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-3602(2) (“Collegiate athletic association means any athletic association, conference, or other group or organization
with authority over intercollegiate sports.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 398A.050 (2021)
(defining “intercollegiate sport” as “a sport played at the collegiate level for which
eligibility requirements for participation . . . are established by a national association that . . . regulates college athletics”).
142
See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 390.1732(a) (2021) (providing that an athletic association, such as the NCAA, shall not “[p]revent a student of a postsecondary educational institution from fully participating in intercollegiate athletics
based upon the student earning compensation as a result of the student’s use of
his or her name, image, or likeness rights”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-107(2)
(2021) (The “[NCAA] . . . shall not prevent . . . a student-athlete of a postsecondary educational institution from earning compensation as a result of the use of the
student-athlete’s name, image or likeness.”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-232(c)
(2021) (stating an athletic association may not “prohibit a student-athlete from
participating in an intercollegiate sport for exercising the student-athlete’s
rights”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3603(3) (2021) (“No collegiate athletic association
shall . . . prevent a student-athlete from fully participating in an intercollegiate
sport . . . because such student-athlete earns compensation for the use of such student-athlete’s name, image, or likeness rights or athletic reputation.”).
143
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3703(E) (2021) (naming certain contracts
that postsecondary institutions can prohibit); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 390.1736
(2021) (preventing college-athletes from entering into apparel contracts that are
in conflict with the student’s team contract); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-107
(2021) (setting limitations on the dates and times student-athletes may endorse
products and receive compensation for their NIL); MO. REV. STAT. § 173.280
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-232(3)(a) 2021) (setting out that student-athletes may not enter into contracts that “conflict with the student-athlete’s team
rules . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3605(1) (2021) (restricting the kinds of contracts student-athletes may enter into).
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apply only to the players’ NIL, 144 which ignores the question of
whether the students are entitled to compensation for their labor as
athletes 145; (4) take effect as of a given date and going forward,
which raises the question as to whether present and past NCAA
players are entitled to retroactive compensation for past denial of
their NIL rights; (5) fail to specify whether the players’ control over
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-1303(a) (2022) (“A student athlete may
enter into a contract and receive compensation for the commercial use of the student-athlete’s publicity rights.”); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (2020) (educational
institutions and athletics associations cannot prevent student athletes from earning
compensation form their NIL); FLA. STAT. § 1006.74(a) (student athletes may
earn compensation for their NIL); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3703(A)(1) (2021) (establishing that “[a]n intercollegiate athlete at a postsecondary education institution
may earn compensation for the use of the athlete’s name, image, or likeness . . .”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 390.1731(2) (2021) (discussing that postsecondary educational institutions may not prevent student-athletes from “earning compensation
as a result of the student’s use of his or her name, image, or likeness rights”);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97-105 (2021) (asserting that student-athletes may “[e]arn
compensation . . . for the use of the name, image, or likeness of the student-athlete
while enrolled at a postsecondary educational institution”); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 173.280(2)(1) (2021) (prohibiting public and private institutions of higher education from preventing student-athletes to earn compensation based on their
“name, image, likeness rights, or athletic reputation”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1232(3)(a) (2021) (dictating that postsecondary institutions may not prevent student-athletes from “earning compensation for the use of the student-athlete’s
name, image, or likeness . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3603(1) (2021) (“No postsecondary institution shall uphold any rule, requirement, standard, or limitation
that prevents a student-athlete from fully participating in an intercollegiate sport
for such postsecondary institution because such student-athlete earns compensation for the use of such student-athlete’s name, image, or likeness rights or athletic
reputation.”).
145
In fact, in one of the America’s first publicity cases, a judge likened the
“taking” of a person’s image as analogous to the American enslavement of people
of African descent. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 220 (Ga.
1905) (“The knowledge that one’s features and form are being used for such a
purpose, and displayed in such places as such advertisements are often liable to
be found, brings not only the person of an extremely sensitive nature, but even the
individual of ordinary sensibility, to a realization that his liberty has been taken
away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he
cannot be otherwise than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under
the control of another, that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave,
without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master; and if a man of
true instincts. or even of ordinary sensibilities, no one can be more conscious of
his enthrallment than he is.” (emphasis added)).
144
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their NIL extends to their estates when they die; 146 (6) fail to provide
effective remedies for noncompliance, beyond minor civil remedies; 147 and (7) fail to account for the intersectionality of race, gender, status, and wealth as it relates to its actual impact on vulnerable,
historically disadvantaged populations such as African Americans. 148 This analysis shows that these pro-NIL laws are a starting
point in the matter and will require follow-up rules and regulations.
2. SCOPE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
What can we learn from the NCAA players’ battle for their NIL
rights, specifically relative to limits on the government’s power of
eminent domain? The following observations show the complexity
of the problem of restricting the government’s expropriation of persona, including NIL. Just to be clear, those observations are purely
mine and are not expressly stated in the NIL legislation. 149
146
See, e.g., Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F.
Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the New York right of publicity does
not apply to a deceased person); Decker, supra note 48 (noting that many states
now have common law and/or statutory rights of publicity that apply postmortem); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3703 (2021) (failing to include whether players’ control over their NIL extends to their estates when they die); MD. CODE. ANN., Education § 15-131 (LexisNexis 2021) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 390 (2021)
(same); MO. REV. STAT. § 173.280 (2021) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-232
(2021) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3600 (2021) (same).
147
See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (lacking remedies for noncompliance);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-232 (2021) (same); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3703 (2021)
(same); MD. CODE. ANN., Education § 15-131 (LexisNexis 2021) (same);. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 390 (2021) (same). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-1775(A)
(providing a cause of action for educational institutions against student athletes
for violating the statute); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-1308 (2022) (providing civil
remedies for violation of the statute); MO. REV. STAT. § 173.280(8)(1) (2021) (allowing “any athlete to bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or actual
damages, or both against third parties violating this provision in the county that
the violation occurs”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3608(1) (2021) (explaining that a
student-athlete may bring a civil action against the postsecondary institution or
collegiate association and receive certain remedies).
148
See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., Education § 15-131 (LexisNexis 2021) (same);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:3703 (2021) (abstaining from mentioning race, gender, status, and wealth); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-97 (2021) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 390 (2021) (same); MO. REV. STAT. § 173.280 (2021) (same); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-232 (2021) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48.3600 (2021) (same); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 398A (2021) (same).
149
Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation by State, supra note 24.
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(1) The NIL legislation fails to address the governmental action
of the NCAA and its members, particularly those State-owned
schools. As a result, the legislation ignores the taking issue.
(2) The NIL legislation fails to address whether the NCAA’s
rules constitute a taking for which just compensation is constitutionally mandated. As a result, the legislation ignores the question as to
whether the NCAA and its members are justly compensating its
players.
(3) The NIL legislation, by failing to address the takings question, also fails to address the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause,
which likely would require more than merely “just compensation.”
As a result, the legislation ignores the failure of the law to provide
college athletes the same equal protection afforded to college students who are not NCAA athletes.
(4) The NIL legislation represents a “privilege” that is being
granted to the players by the legislature, and is not stated to be a
right of which the players are entitled. As a result, the players’ NIL
benefits are subject to the whims of the legislation and are not based
on the Constitution.
(5) Neither the legislation, nor the Alston Court, 150 addresses the
retroactivity of benefits that current and future players are entitled.
As a result, the law fails to provide any remedy or compensation to
past player for the expropriation of their NIL.
(6) The legislation fails to provide college athletes, many of
whom are racial minorities from underprivileged communities, any
meaningful remedies for their historical mistreatment and continuing exploitation of their labor.
Hence, even in the face of reform, college athletes are left holding a hat in hand begging for a handout, rather than being protected
from governmental overreaching.
C.
Wrongful Taking
Further, those pro-NIL laws raise a most pertinent issue of constitutional law. That is, do the NCAA amateurism rules constitute a
“taking” that requires “just compensation,” pursuant to the Taking
Clause? One might ask how can the Takings Clause, which relates
to the government’s expropriation of private property, relate to the
150

See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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NCAA rules? The answer to that question requires three findings:
(1) that the NCAA rules are subject to the Takings Clause, (2) that
such a taking was not justly compensated, and (3) that the Takings
Clause applies to persona rights, namely NIL. While this matter has
not been litigated, it appears that the facts support the finding that
the NCAA rules might constitute a “taking” within the laws interpreting the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The following
argues that (1) the NCAA rules constitute a governmental taking and
(2) they are a wrongful taking because they arguably fail to provide
just compensation. That will leave open the question whether NIL
is subject to eminent domain, which is discussed in Part II.
1. “RIGHTFUL TAKING”
As this section discusses the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause, a brief presentation of the elements of “rightful” taking under that Clause is appropriate. 151 In a nutshell, for there to be a
“rightful” taking, 152 the following doctrinal elements must be met:
(1) Any level of government, federal, state, or local government 153
can exercise a taking for a public purpose, although a private party
may receive the benefit of a taking. 154 (2) The Government must

See Takings, supra note 34 (defining a “taking” as “when the government
seizes private property for public use”).
152
“Rightful taking,” for the purpose of this Article, means where a governmental expropriation complies with the constitutional requirements of a taking
under such Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
153
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment originally applied only to the
federal government. However, the Supreme Court in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago decided that the Fourteenth Amendment incidentally
extended the effects of that provision to the State and local governments. 166 U.S.
226, 235 (1897). Justice Harlan argued that the concept of due process of law
required fair compensation to be given for any private property seized by the state.
“In determining what is due process of law, regard must be had to substance, not
to form.” Id.
154
See Takings, supra note 34 (indicating that the government is required to
provide just compensation to the individual subject to the taking and that the government is permitted seize private property “if doing so will increase the general
public welfare” even in the form of economic developments).
151
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“take” 155 private property, 156 but not as a criminal penalty 157 or civil
penalty. 158 (3) The property subject to a taking can include “tangible” property, such as land and houses, as well as intangible property, such as contract rights. 159 (4) A taking may be “physical,”
where the government takes title to property, such as land, from its
owner, or may be “constructive” or “regulatory taking,” when the
government restricts the owner’s rights so much that the governmental action becomes the functional equivalent of a physical seizure. 160 (5) A taking must be for “public use” or “public purpose,”
See id. (describing that a taking can either be a physical taking where “the
government literally takes the property from its owner” or a constructive taking
where “the government restricts the owner’s rights” so much as to be “the functional equivalent of a physical seizure”).
156
See Legal Info. Inst., Private Property, CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/private_property (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (defining private property as “property owned by private parties—essentially anyone
or anything other than the government).
157
See generally Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/afms/types-federal-forfeiture (last updated Feb. 17,
2022) (describing civil forfeiture as an action against property where no criminal
conviction is required); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
158
See Takings, supra note 34.
159
See id. (“In United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947), the Supreme
Court held that even if the government does not physically seize private property,
the action is still a taking ‘when inroads are made upon an owner’s use of it to an
extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by
agreement or in course of time.’”). This includes both tangible and intangible
property, such as franchises and contracts. For example, the City of Oakland notoriously tried to claim the Raiders National League Football team through eminent domain. See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 63 (Cal.
1982). In Lynch v. United States, the Supreme Court held that valid contracts of
the United States are property, and the rights of private individuals arising out of
them are protected by the Fifth Amendment, noting that “[t]he Fifth Amendment
commands that property be not taken without making just compensation. Valid
contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality,
a state or the United States. Rights against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment. When the United States enters
into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the
law applicable to contracts between private individuals.” 292 U.S. 571, 579
(1934) (internal citations omitted).
160
See Takings, supra note 34 (“Many regulatory takings disputes arise in the
context of land use regulation. The Supreme Court held that it there is not a requirement for government compensation where such regulations ‘substantially
155
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which the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London
broadly interpreted to mean “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,”161 although many states responded by enacting more
restrictive laws. 162 (6) The Fifth Amendment mandates that if the
government takes private property for public use, the government
must provide “just compensation,” which is typically compensatory
as determined by an appraisal of the property’s fair market value. 163

advance legitimate governmental interests,’ and as long as the regulations do not
prevent a property owner from making ‘economically viable use of his land.’”)
(internal citation omitted).
161
See id. (“In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the Supreme
Court allowed a taking when the government used eminent domain to seize private property to facilitate a private development. The Court considered the taking
to be a public use because the community would enjoy the furthering of economic
development. Further, the Kelo court determined that a governmental claim of
eminent domain is justified if the seizure is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose.”) In the dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that the
majority opinion eliminates “any distinction between private and public use of
property—and thereby effectively delete[s] the words ‘for public use’ from the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment” and benefits the rich at the expense of
the poor. Kelo, at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Berman v. Parker, a landmark
decision that laid the foundation for Kelo, Justice Douglas expanded the definition
of “public use” to include “public purpose” based on physical, aesthetic, and monetary benefits, such as urban blight. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
162
See Takings, supra note 34 (“The Kelo decision significantly broadened
the government’s takings power. This caused significant controversy, and states
were quick to act to quell concerns about this expansion of power. In response to
Kelo, many states have passed laws which have restricted governments’ takings
abilities (such as implementing a stricter definition of what constitutes a ‘public
use,’ requiring heightened levels of scrutiny to justify an action categorized as a
taking, etc.).”).
163
See id. (explaining that “the appropriate remedy for a taking will typically
consist of compensatory damages.”) (internal citations omitted). If the property is
taken before the payment is made, “interest” accrues (although the courts have
refrained from using the term “interest”). See United States v. Fifty Acres of Land,
469 U.S. 24, 26 (1985). The Court held the Fifth Amendment does not require
consequential damages when the market value of the condemned property is ascertainable and when there is no showing of manifest injustice. Id. at 33. The
Court declined to award consequential damages for the costs of the substitute facility, where there was a duty to replace the condemned facility. Id. at 26.
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Hence, if a taking fails to comply with any of those six elements,
then I deem such a taking to be a “wrongful” taking. 164
2. NCAA RULES ARE GOVERNMENTAL
For there to be a taking, such an action must result from a governmental expropriation, although such action can benefit private
enterprises. Here, I argue that the NCAA rules are governmental. (1)
The NCAA is in “agency” and/or “partnership” with all levels of
government, which makes their actions governmental. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the NCAA member schools are
State-owned educational institutions that operate with the approval
and consensus of the citizens of those States. 165 (2) The NCAA benefits from non-profit tax status, which means that their tax-free profits are being subsidized by other taxpayers. 166 (3) The NCAA, and
particularly its state-owned member schools, utilize publicly-owned
and financed state-owned university stadiums, and other assets and
staff, to produce its sports product. 167 (4) The NCAA has sought an
164
Takings that are not “for public use” are not directly covered by Takings
Clause doctrine; however, such a taking might violate due process rights under
the Fourteenth amendment, or other applicable law. See Chicago, Burlington. &
Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Arguably, a due process
claim might allow for remedies beyond merely just compensation. There are also
the questions of whether state constitutions protect against the state government’s
taking of property without just compensation, and whether the granting of nonprofit status to the NCAA and special tax exemptions makes the NCAA an agent
of the federal government for purposes of taking analysis.
165
This highlights the question that if persona, particularly NIL, is the property of the student athletes, then the State where the athlete is enrolled is taking
that property, and without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well likely in violation of various
State Constitutions. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art I, § 4 (“Property shall not be taken
or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes
and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.”).
166
See generally John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College
Athletics, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109 (2010), http://www.illinoislawreview.org/wpcontent/ilr-content/articles/2010/1/Colombo.pdf?msclkid=e861bb62cbfb11ec8a
17d68c8c285cea.
167
See, e.g., Drew Nantais, LSU Showcases Insane New Football Facility after $28 Million Renovation, SPORTING NEWS (July 22, 2019), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/lsu-showcases-insane-new-football-facilityafter-28-million-renovation/1m9r8ntste1s713dge0mq80nat?msclkid=c5b9b007c
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exemption from the federal antitrust laws to avoid the player compensation issue. 168 And (5) the NCAA and its members have employed its eligibility rules to expropriate the private property of its
student-athletes, namely their NIL.
Hence, one might conclude that the NCAA rules constitute governmental action that is subject to the Takings Clause. That leads the
discussion to the question, of whether those takings are wrongful,
that is, whether the players have been justly compensated.
3. UNJUST COMPENSATION
Although the Alston Court relied on neither a Fifth Amendment
Takings analysis, nor Fourteenth Amendment Due Process principles, 169 it nevertheless highlighted the inequity in the players’ compensation. That inequity is clear evidence that the players are not
being justly compensation for the expropriation of their labor and/or
for their NIL, as is provided in the dicta of the majority decision in
Alston and in the concurring opinion of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, as
described next. 170
In Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, he pointed out that the
historical rationale for the NCAA amateurism rules have become
questionable in today’s economic environment. 171 While recognizing the benefits that the NCAA and its members bestow on its athletes, Justice Gorsuch noted that the NCAA has become a “sprawling enterprise” and “a massive business.” 172 The Court documented
the obvious inequities in compensation between what the leadership
of the NCAA receives, what some members schools receive, and
what some coaches receive, as compared to what the athletes receive: 173
bfd11ecab254b43a829d55b. Arguably, state-owned, member schools have a
marked disadvantage over NCAA schools that are privately funded.
168
See Marc Edelman, Why Congress Would Be Crazy to Grant the NCAA an
Antitrust Exemption, FORBES (May 6, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2020/05/06/why-congress-would-be-crazy-to-grant-the-ncaa-an-antitr
ust-exemption/?msclkid=a7a9983acbfe11ec946155d4ddeeddc2&sh=4ec25aff70
a9.
169
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2154 (2021).
170
Id. at 2168 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
171
Id. at 2150.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 2151.
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The president of the NCAA earns nearly $4 million
per year. Commissioners of the top conferences take
home between $2 to $5 million. College athletic directors average more than $1 million annually. And
annual salaries for top Division I college football
coaches approach $11 million, with some of their assistants making more than $2.5 million.174
On the other end of the spectrum, college athletes of NCAA
member colleges are severely limited to what they are compensated,
usually to the cost of tuition, room, board, and fees. 175 In the recent
Alston case, these former college athletes argued that their compensation was grossly unfair, and that the NCAA is a monopoly with an
unfair competitive advantage. 176
Less subdued than Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, 177 Justice
Kavanaugh, stated that “Today… the Court holds that the NCAA
has violated the antitrust laws.” 178 He “adds [his] concurring opinion
to underscore that the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also
raise serious questions under the antitrust laws.” 179
What follows, in his opinion, is Justice Kavanaugh’s scathing
attack on the inequities in the NCAA’s compensation of the players.
He points out the following: (1) The NCAA has a monopoly on the

174

Id.
See generally David J. Berri, Paying NCAA Athletes, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 479, 479 (2016); Comment, Ending the Amateurism Façade—Pay College
Athletes, 9 HOUS. L. REV. 158, 167 (2019).
176
Joel Mitnick & Ngoc Pham Hulbig, Supreme Court to Weigh in College
Sports: The Intersection of Antitrust and “Amateurism,” 12 NAT’L L. REV., no.
99, 2020, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-to-weigh-college-sports-intersection-antitrust-and-amateurism (explaining that plaintiffs in
Alston argued “that the top athletic teams are operating a system that acts as a
classic restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act” and that,
absent those restraints “student-athletes would be compensated at a level more
commensurate with their value to their universities, conferences, and the
NCAA.”).
177
See id. at 2147–66.
178
Id. at 2166 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
179
Id. at 2166–67 (“[T]here are serious questions whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”).
175
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college sport market, which suppresses players’ compensation;180
(2) “The NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost
any other industry in America”; 181 and (3) “Price-fixing labor is
price-fixing labor.” 182
In reference to the inequity in what the NCAA top executives,
coaches, and university administrators are paid compared to what
the players receive, Justice Kavanaugh stated: “It is highly questionable whether the NCAA and its member colleges can justify not paying students athletes a fair share of the revenues on the circular theory that the defining characteristic of college sports is that the colleges do not pay student athletes.” 183 This observation was very explicit when he observed:
The bottom line is that the NCAA and its member
colleges are suppressing the pay of student athletes
who collectively generate billions of dollars in revenues for colleges every year. Those enormous sums
of money flow to seemingly everyone except the student athletes. College presidents, athletic directors,
coaches, conference commissioners, and NCAA executives take in six- and seven-figure salaries. Colleges build lavish new facilities. But the student athletes who generate the revenues, many of whom are
African American and from lower-income backgrounds, end up with little or nothing. 184
Justice Kavanaugh’s critique of the gross wealth inequities in college athletics is evidence of unjust compensation in takings analysis
or unjust enrichment under equitable principles.
The concurring opinion ends on a warning message to the
NCAA and its members:
Id. at 2168 (“The NCAA acknowledges that it controls the market… set
the price for student athlete labor… that the student athletes currently have no
meaningful ability to negotiate with the NCAA over the compensation rules.”).
181
Id. at 2167 (“Law firms cannot conspire to cabin lawyers salaries in the
name of providing legal services out of a ‘love of the law.’”).
182
Id. at 2168 (“Or to put it in more doctrinal terms, a monopoly cannot launder its price-fixing of labor by calling it product definition.”).
183
Id. at 2168.
184
See id.
180
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[T]raditions alone cannot justify the NCAA’s decision to build a massive money-raising enterprise on
the backs of student-athletes who are not fairly compensated. Nowhere else in America can businesses
get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair
market rate on the theory that their product is defined
by not paying their workers a fair market rate. And
under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different. The
NCAA is not above the law.” 185
What follows is my elaboration of what the Alston Court’s view
of the unjust compensation that the NCAA players receive, compared to the that of the NCAA executive, coaches, and the school
leadership. In its fiscal year that ended August 31, 2019, the NCAA,
a private, nonprofit enterprise, reported revenues of over $1.1 billion, with a positive increase in net assets of $70 million, and net
assets of just under a half of a billion dollars. 186 It receives most of
its annual revenue from two sources: television and marketing rights
for the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship and ticket sales
for all championships. 187 It proudly reported that about sixty percent
of its annual revenue—around $600 million—is annually distributed
directly to Division I member schools and conferences, while more
than $150 million funds Division I championships. 188 At the same
time, close to $170 million, or about fifteen percent of its annual
revenue, went to student athlete services and championship support,
including costs for insurance, drug testing and additional support
(nearly $65 million), general and administrative expenses (nearly
$45 million), and association-wide expenses, including legal services (nearly $60 million). 189 NCAA President Mark Emmert’s base
salary for the calendar year 2019 was $2.5 million and his total

Id. at 2169.
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS ASS’N, NCAA CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS: AUGUST 31, 2020 & 2019 (2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazon
aws.com/ncaa/finance/2019-20NCAAFIN_FinancialStatement.pdf.
187
Finances, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/finances (last visited Feb. 14,
2022).
188
Id.
189
Id.
185
186
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compensation was $2.9 million, according to the association’s latest
federal tax return. 190
Similarly, states and their college-level educational institutions
reap substantial financial benefits from their membership with the
NCAA. For example, a state like California receives millions every
year from the NCAA, through its state-owned member colleges. 191
California’s Governor Gavin Newson, in supporting college athletes’ rights, noted that the Fair Pay to Play Act would rebalance a
power structure in which NCAA universities receive more than $14
billion annually, and the nonprofit NCAA receives more than $1 billion, “while the actual product, the folks that are putting their lives
on the line . . . are getting nothing.” 192
Then there are the incredible salaries 193 paid to some NCAA
coaches of state-owned schools, 194 which rival the highest paid
190
See Steve Berkowitz, NCAA President Mark Emmert Credited with $2.9
Million in Total Pay for 2019 Calendar Year, USA TODAY (July 19, 2021, 8:04
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2021/07/19/ncaa-mark-em
mert-total-pay-2019/8015855002/.
191
See Murphy, supra note 15; Goldman, supra note 15.
192
See McLaughlin, supra note 15.
193
Salaries are only one form of financial benefit that these coaches receive.
For instance, they have major endorsement contracts, consulting contracts, shoe
contracts, as well as directors on corporate board, which come close to or exceed
their contracts with their schools. As a result, many of the top coaches have tremendous net worth. See, e.g., Nick Saban Net Worth, CELEBRITY NET WORTH,
https://www.celebritynetworth.com/richest-athletes/richest-coaches/nick-sabannet-worth/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2022); see also Anthony Riccobono, Nick Saban
Net Worth: Salary, Contract Extension Put Alabama HC Among Highest-Paid
Coaches, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 7, 2021, 3:38 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/
nick-saban-net-worth-salary-contract-extension-put-alabama-hc-among-highestpaid-3219602 (reporting that Saban signed an eight-year deal worth at least $74.4
million in the summer of 2018 and that, with his $9.1 million salary and $950,000
in bonuses, Saban became the first college football coach to make over $10 million in a season last year).
194
These salaries highlight State-owned schools to emphasize the governmental takings of players’ persona. Nevertheless, the coaches private school members
of the NCAA make comparably, incredibly high salaries. For example, Duke University’s basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski received total annual pay of
$7,044,221. See 2021 NCAA Basketball Coach Pay, USA TODAY (Mar. 9, 2021),
https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mens-basketball/coach. Texas Christian
University’s football coach Gary Patterson received total annual pay of $6.1 million. See NCAAF Coaches Salaries, USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2021),
https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries.
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salaries of professional coaches. 195 For example, in 2020, the top ten
highest paid football coaches for state-owned NCAA institutions
ranged from $6 million to $9.3 million.196 Moreover, the 2020
NCAA men’s basketball coach salaries for state schools in the top
ten are equally shocking, ranging from $4 million to $8 million.197
With these salaries, it is hard to argue that college sports have not
become highly commercialized and extremely profitable for some.
In the Alston case, 198 some former college athletes argued that
their compensation was grossly unfair, and that the NCAA is a monopoly with an unfair competitive advantage. 199 As previously
noted, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with their contention. One scholarly analysis found that while players are valued or worth millions
to these Universities and the NCAA, eighty-six percent of college
athletes live below the poverty line, with many qualifying and receiving government Pell Grants. 200 In addition to devaluing their labor, the players claimed they were negatively impacted by the
NCAA’s former prohibition on their receiving funds from their
NIL. 201 These claims were advanced in litigation in which the players sought to enhance their compensation for their play, through a
demand that they are permitted to benefit financially from their
NIL. 202
In conclusion, both the Alston decision, as well as the subsequent
laws granting players some NIL privileges, miss the big picture,
which is the constitutionality of the NCAA amateurism rules. Further, it is clear that while the NCAA rules are subject to the Takings
195

Id.
Id. (reporting salaries for Nick Saban of Alabama ($9.3 million), Ed Orgeron of LSU ($8.9 million), Dabo Swinney of Clemson ($8.3 million), Jim Harbaugh of Michigan ($8 million), Jimbo Fisher of Texas A&M ($7.5 million),
Kirby Smart of Georgia ($6.9 million), Lincoln Riley of Oklahoma ($6.5 million),
and Dan Mullen of Florida ($6 million)).
197
2021 NCAA Basketball Coach Pay, supra note 194 (reporting salaries for
John Calipari of Kentucky State ($8 million), Chris Beard of Texas Tech ($5 million), Rick Barnes of Tennessee ($4.9 million), Roy Williams of North Carolina
($2.5 million), Tom Izzo of Michigan State ($4 million), and Fred Hoiberg of
Nebraska ($4 million)).
198
See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2155 (2021).
199
See Mitnick & Hulbig, supra note 176.
200
See Williams, supra note 19.
201
Mitnick & Hulbig, supra note 176.
202
Id.
196
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Clause, that those rules violate the Takings Clause, because the players are not being justly compensated for the taking of their NIL
and/or their labor. Additionally, the Alston decision, as well as the
subsequent laws granting players some NIL privileges, fail to recognize the property rights of the athletes. That raises the remaining,
important question: Do NCAA players possess a property right in
their NIL, and is that right protected against the reach of eminent
domain?
II.

RIGHT OF PROPERTY

[E]very man has a property in his own person: this
no Body has any Right but to himself.
— John Locke 203
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time
to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of
such protection. Political, social, and economic
changes entail the recognition of new rights, and the
common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the
new demands of society. 204
Part I identified how both the Alston decision and the pro-NIL
state laws fail to address whether college athletes possess a property
right to their NIL that is protected from governmental exploitation.
I explore that thesis through the lens of a libertarian “rights’

LOCKE, supra note 71 (“For this Labour being the unquestionable Property
of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is one joyned to, at
least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.”); cf. JEREMY
BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 (Richard Hildreth trans., 1840) (1802)
(providing the most influential utilitarian justification for private property: “Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation
in which we stand towards it”).
204
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
203
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paradigm,” 205 as a counterbalance to the law as a vehicle of social
oppression 206 or “privilege paradigm.” 207 This Part supports the thesis that both (1) NCAA players’ NIL and (2) everyone’s persona is
outside the scope of the government’s eminent domain powers, and
thereby warrant protection from governmental expropriation. That
thesis serves to answer two relevant questions: (1) Do the NCAA’s
eligibility rules that regulate its players’ use of their NIL constitute
a wrongful exercise of eminent domain, even if there is just compensation for the taking? (2) Are NCAA players’ NIL in particular,
and everyone’s persona in general, beyond the reach of eminent domain?
This Part supports my “persona is outside of eminent domain”
thesis by arguing for three suppositions: (1) Libertarian principles
as embodied in the Constitution reserve to the people rights not expressly granted to the government by the Constitution; (2) NIL in
particular, and persona in general, are not the kind of property the
Founders envisioned as the subject of a taking and should never be
the subject of the “public purpose” requirement of the Takings
Clause; and (3) Governmental expropriation of persona, including
NIL, is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
“Rights’ paradigm,” for purposes of this Article, means a view of the legal
system as one which identifies and embraces the idea that people are entitled to
control their own destiny, through the ownership and control of their own selves,
free from the indiscretions of the powerful and protected against unfair infringements. This rights-based approach to private property reflects former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s vision of federalism, as a means to
protect individuals from undue federal governmental intrusion. See Bradley W.
Joondeph, The Deregulatory Valence of Justice O’Connor’s Federalism, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 507, 541 (2007).
206
Law has been a tool of oppression, combined with force, claims of Godgiven rights, title, tradition, culture, religion, and government. See generally Elanor Taylor, Groups and Oppression, 31 HYPATIA 520, 520–21 (2016) (“Oppression is a form of injustice that occurs when one social group is subordinated while
another is privileged, and oppression is maintained by a variety of different mechanisms including social norms, stereotypes and institutional rules.”); Lynn Weber,
A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality,
22 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 13, 20 (1998).
207
“Privilege paradigm,” for purposes of this Article, means a view of the legal system that artificially uses apparent majoritarian authority as a veil to protect
and enforce the social and financial interest of the powerful, compared to a legal
system wherein rights are guaranteed against exploitation regardless of age, class,
race, gender, or other socioeconomic status.
205
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Amendment and should be judged under the “strict scrutiny” lens of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
A.
Foundational Libertarian Principles
When it comes to protecting private property from governmental
expropriation, our Constitution is conflicted. On the one hand, as
explained below, the right to private property is a foundational principle that defines the American spirit, our history, and our culture. 208
Yet, on the other hand, the Founders adopted the government’s superior authority over private property—that is, eminent domain—as
long as it uses that property for a public purpose and provides the
property’s owner with just compensation, via the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. 209 Hence, when it comes to the boundaries of
eminent domain, the Constitution presents us with a conundrum.
Does the government have an absolute right to take private property
or are there some property rights that the government should be prohibited from taking for public purpose?
Let’s start with an exploration of the fundamental right to private
property. 210 I contend that the Right of Property lies at the intersection of personal and property rights, and that every person is fundamentally and constitutionally entitled to this right. Most importantly
for purposes of this Article, Right of Property includes a natural
property right in one’s “self”—encompassing a person’s attributes
or identities, such as labor, name, image, likeness, and other unequivocal identifiers. 211
The Right of Property is not new; it defines our constitutional
history and culture. 212 Since the establishment of the Republic, the
See infra, Part II, A.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
210
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
211
“Attributes” of a person include things like the fruits of their labor, their
brand, or any other quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part
of someone (both tangible and intangible). But rights that protect the attributes of
a person are not limited to the right of privacy, the right of publicity, and the right
to not be enslaved. These rights extend to all mediums such as print, online, fantasy, cyberspace, and the virtual universe. See Right of Self, supra note *.
212
See supra Part I. The observation does not ignore the ongoing political and
constitutional law tensions that historically and currently surround issues relating
to self. For example, the rights to “body autonomy” or “body integrity,” which
208
209
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United States Constitution has slowly, yet continuously, moved towards realizing a libertarian vision of the Right of Property, protected from governmental takings. 213 Constitutional restrictions on
eminent domain are arguably based on jurisprudential principles, including principles espoused in groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions, as well as constitutional principles found in the Fourth,
Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and the Fourteenth Amendments. 214
relate to a woman’s freedom of choice, to a person’s right to deny medical treatment, such as vaccination against COVID-19, and the right of privacy. See generally RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2002).
213
The issue of who “controls” or “owns” one’s property is as old as the
founding of the Republic. Relative to the exploitation of labor, there was a historic
battle over who controls the property in oneself, particularly the self of enslaved
people of African descent. While the concept of liberty was a fundamental principle of the new Republic, it was not “universal”. See Elizabeth C. Tucker, Comment, Has the Supreme Court Taken a Wrong Turn? An Analysis of the Supreme
Court’s Decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 107 DICK. L. REV. 675, 695
(2003) (“Racial concerns were not an issue at common law; thus, the Framers of
the United State Constitution did not explicitly provide for protection of minorities in the Bill of Rights.”); see also Blackness as State Property, supra note *.
As we know, it took a Civil War and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment
to constitutionally guarantee Right of Property, relative to the expropriation of a
person’s liberty, labor, and property, against the state-sponsored oppression called
“slavery.” The term “slavery” has been aptly replaced with the term “enslavement” to better describe the horrific abuses that the victims or enslaved had to
ensure by their enslavers, who were backed by the government.
214
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
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The rights protected by these amendments suggest the Founders
favored the protection of private property over the government’s
right to eminent domain. Therefore, I contend that Right of Property
is a libertarian vision which entitles the property of the powerless to
legal protections against governmental expropriation. 215 Without a
strong libertarian view of Right of Property, the powerful will continue to use the legal system to exploit the powerless, widening the
wealth gap and destroying the middle class.
When one closely studies the historical and philosophical development of the Constitution, one would conclude that protecting persona from eminent domain takings embraces the Founder’s belief
and adoption of libertarian principles. The closest historical reference to persona rights is embodied in the concept of “liberty.” A
brief legal history of the American Revolution, the establishment of
the Republic, and development of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill
of Rights shows that the Founders believed in Right of Property in
the form of persona. 216 On July 7, 1776, the Continental Congress
voted to adopt the Declaration of Independence, written mainly by
Thomas Jefferson. 217 On July 4, 1776, the Declaration, which was
unanimously adopted by all the thirteen colonies, proclaimed that
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is a fundamental right: selfevident, inalienable, and endowed by the Creator. 218 A movement
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
215
See infra INTRODUCTION.
216
See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 189–212 (1993).; Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, Property, in
A COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 638, 642–43 (Jack P. Greene &
J. R. Pole eds., 2000) (noting the Constitution of 1787 and Alexander Hamilton’s
The Federalist no. 78 “provided the basis for an inviolable right of property”);
GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS
DIFFERENT (2006); GARRY WILLIS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 207–17 (1978).
217
See Continental Congress, HISTORY (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.history.
com/topics/american-revolution/the-continental-congress (“The committee consisted of five men, including John Adams and Benjamin Franklin . . . of Pennsylvania. But the declaration was primarily the work of one man, Thomas Jefferson . . . .”).
218
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis
added).
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subsequently developed for constitutional reform, culminating in
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 where delegates decided to
create a new system of government. 219 This government recognized
a Right of Property. 220
The Founders clearly adopted the libertarian principles of John
Locke, 221 David Hume, 222 Adam Smith,223 and Immanuel Kant.224
The hallmark of libertarianism is self-autonomy or the sovereignty
of the individual as right-holders, including the right in themselves
and a right in their property. 225
Continental Congress, supra note 217 (“The delegates at the convention
decided to scrap the Articles of Confederation completely and create a new system
of government.”).
220
Cf. Freeman & Mensch, supra note 216, at 642 (“The new conception of
property as private right reached its fruition through the Constitution of
1787 . . . .”).
221
See LOCKE, supra note 71, at 116 (“[E]very Man has a Property in his own
Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.”).
222
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT
TO INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 394 (The Floating Press 2009) (1740) (“[S]elf or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have
a reference.”).
223
Samuel Fleishacker, Adam Smith’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ARCHIVE, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/
entries/smith-moral-political/ (last updated Nov. 11, 2020) (“A central thread running through [Smith’s] work is an unusually strong commitment to the soundness
of the ordinary human being’s judgments, and a concern to fend off attempts, by
philosophers and policy-makers, to replace those judgments with the supposedly
better ‘systems’ invented by intellectuals.”).
224
See Libertarianism, supra note 58 (“[L]ibertarian theory is closely related
to . . . Immanuel Kant.”); see also Daniel Russell, Self-Ownership as a Form of
Ownership, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREEDOM 21–39 (David Schmidtz &
Carmen Pavel eds., 2018).
225
See Libertarianism, supra note 58 (noting “the idea of self-ownership” is
the focus of most libertarians). Right of Property captures this key feature of libertarianism: “[T]he key libertarian starting point is that people have a very stringent (perhaps the most stringent possible) set of rights over their persons, giving
them the kind of control over themselves that one might have over possessions
they own. This includes (1) rights to control the use of the entity: including a
liberty-right to use it as well as a claim-right that others not use it without one’s
consent, (2) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan),
(3) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights, (4) compensation rights
in case others use the entity without one’s consent, and (5) enforcement rights
219
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The Founders used libertarianism to challenge the traditional
sources of control over individual rights by establishing the central
role of “natural” or God-given individual rights, 226 including “the
rights to life, liberty, private property, freedom of speech and association, freedom of worship, government by consent, equality under
the law, and moral autonomy . . . .” 227 The purpose of government,
according to liberals, is to protect these and other individual rights,
and in general, liberals have contended that government power
should be limited to that which is necessary to accomplish this
task. 228
The Founders who wrote the Virginia Declaration of Rights, including George Mason and Thomas Jefferson, the latter of which
was the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, were

(e.g. rights to restrain persons about to violate these rights).” Id. (discussing Robert Nozick’s theory of self-ownership and its relation to libertarianism).
226
See David Boaz, Libertarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/libertarianism-politics (last visited Mar. 05,
2022). Some of the sources of control the Founders sought to challenge included
monarchic government, an overbearing and overtaxing King George III, state-established religion, the Church of England, and government-sponsored monopolies
such as the East Indian Tea Company. See infra note 239 (discussing the “real
life, pragmatic” reasons the Founders revolted from English rule).
227
Boaz, supra note 226 (“The first well-developed statement of libertarianism, An Agreement of the People (1647), was produced by the radical republican
Leveler movement during the English Civil Wars (1642–51). . . . [It] included the
ideas of self-ownership, private property, legal equality, religious toleration, and
limited, representative government.”).
228
There were real life, pragmatic, and not purely philosophical reasons why
the American colonists revolted from English rule; for example, colonists felt they
should not be taxed since they did not take part in voting for members of Parliament in England. See Continental Congress, supra note 217. These taxes led to
the infamous Boston Tea Party, where “a group of frustrated colonists protested
taxation without representation by dumping 342 chests of tea into Boston Harbor.” Id. On September 5, 1774, the First Continental Congress issued a Declaration of Rights which “affirm[ed] its loyalty to the British crown but disput[ed] the
British Parliament’s right to tax it.” Id. On October 14, 1774, in response to British
Parliament’s enacting the Intolerable Acts, the First Continental Congress declared that citizens were “entitled to life, liberty, and property.” Declaration and
Resolves of the First Continental Congress, YALE L. SCH.: THE AVALON PROJECT,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2022)
(“That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property: and they have never ceded
to any foreign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their consent.”).
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clearly influenced by the philosophies of John Locke. 229 In 1689,
Locke argued in his Two Treatises of Government that political society existed for the sake of protecting “property,” which he defined
as a person’s “life, liberty, and estate . . . .” 230 In “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” Locke elaborated on the relationship between libertarianism and the limitations of government when he wrote that the
magistrate’s power was limited to preserving a person’s “civil interest,” which he described as “life, liberty, health, and indolency of
body; and the possession of outward things . . . .” 231 Hence, the
Founders’ adoption of their belief in the enjoyment of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness as a property right 232 echoes Locke’s
view of the universality of natural law and its relationship to property rights. 233

229
See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–54 (1967) (concluding major themes of eighteenth-century libertari-

anism were brought to realization in written constitutions, bills of rights, and limits on executive and legislative powers). These ideas and beliefs inspired both the
American Revolution and the French Revolution. These were not superfluous
words on paper, but, rather, reflected the Founders’ personal beliefs that the right
to the enjoyment of attributes of self was fundamental. For example, Samuel Adams stated that “[a]mong the Natural Rights of the Colonists [were] . . . a right to
life . . . liberty . . . [and] property . . . .” Rights of the Colonists: November 20,
1772, REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND BEYOND, https://www.revolutionary-war-andbeyond.com/rights-of-the-colonists-november-20-1772.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2022). George Mason also expressed his belief in libertarianism: “[A]ll
men . . . when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life . . . .” The Virginia
Declaration of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/virginia-declaration-of-rights.
230
LOCKE, supra note 71, at 141 (“[N]o political society can be, nor subsist,
without having the power to preserve the property . . . .”).
231
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 6–7 (1689) (“It is the
duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure
unto all the people . . . the just possession of these things belonging to this life.”).
232
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
233
See Libertarianism, supra note 58 (“The most famous account of how unilateral original acquisition is possible remains Locke’s labor theory. . . . The precise nature of Locke’s argument . . . seeks to ground property in the (prior) rights
of self-ownership.”).
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After the U.S. Constitution went into effect in 1789, the Continental Congress adjourned and was replaced by the U.S. Congress. 234 Shortly thereafter, Congress ratified a Bill of Rights consisting of the first ten amendments to the Constitution, guaranteeing
the fundamental rights which were used as justifications for the Revolution. 235 Additionally, as evidenced by their drafting the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the Founders were aware
the English common law identified a right to the natural attributes
of self as an inherent natural right, entitled to protection from wrongful governmental infringement—as digested in Blackstone’s Commentaries. 236 Blackstone noted that the “right of personal security”
included “enjoyment of life” and that “[l]ife is an immediate gift of
God, a right inherent by nature in every individual.” 237 He also emphasized that the government could not take a person’s life, liberty,
or property arbitrarily or without the express warrant of law. 238
Continental Congress, supra note 217.
See Bill of Rights (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INST., https://www.billofrights
institute.org/primary-sources/bill-of-rights (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (“[T]he Bill
of Rights . . . list[s] specific prohibitions on governmental power, in response to
calls from several states for greater constitutional protection for individual liberties.”). The concepts codified in these amendments are built upon those in earlier
documents. Id. See THE VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 1 (1776) (“[T]hey
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property . . . .”);
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 2 (1787) (“No man shall be deprived of his liberty
or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land . . . .”); ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689) (listing the rights of the subjects of the seventeenth
century English monarchy); MAGNA CARTA (1215) (“We furthermore grant and
give to all the freemen of our realm for ourselves and our heirs in perpetuity the
liberties written below . . . .”).
236
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
118–20 (1765–1769), (“[T]he rights of persons that are commanded to be observed by the municipal law . . . are due from every citizen . . . and . . . belong to
him . . . .”).
237
Id. at 125–29 (“The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual . . . . This natural life being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the great creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual . . . .”).
238
Id. at 129–30 ([I]t is enacted by the statute 5 Edw. III. c. 9. that no man
shall be forejudged of life or limb, contrary to the great charter and the law of the
234
235

706

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

Furthermore, when drafting the Constitution, the Founders borrowed from various previously established state constitutions that
expressly provided that the right to one’s enjoyment of attributes of
self was a fundamental right. 239 The Founders deemed this right so
fundamental that they thought it unnecessary to repeat it in the U.S.
Constitution itself; nonetheless, the Anti-Federalists insisted in the
protection of self, leading to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Moreover, many state constitutions have such a provision today. 240
While the Constitution did not expressly provide for Right of
Property, the Fifth Amendment comes close by stating that “[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property . . . nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 241 Later, the Fourteenth Amendment expressly provides that
States cannot deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property . . . nor
deny any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” 242
Taken together, these Due Process Clauses provide two different
types of protection against actions by the state and federal governments: (1) procedural due process, which requires that before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, the government must
follow certain procedures; and (2) substantive due process, which
requires that if depriving a person of life, liberty, or property, the

land: and again, by statute 28 Ed. III. c. 3. that no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law.”).
239
For example, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776 proclaimed “[t]hat all men . . . have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights,
amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty.” PA. CONSTITUTION OF 1776, art. I (“That all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”).
240
See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“[A]ll men . . . have certain inherent
rights . . . namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property . . . .”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“That no person shall be
deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . . .”).
241
See infra Part II.B.1.
242
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”).
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government must have sufficient justification. 243 The “enjoyment of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” should include the enjoyment of financial benefits one can generate using their own attributes, including one’s labor, NIL, and other real and virtual features
of self.
Therefore, Right of Property as embodied in the principles of
“life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness” 244 supports that proposition
that persona in general and NIL in particular is fundamental and
should supersede the government’s eminent domain powers.
B.
Beyond the Scope of Eminent Domain
There are two arguments to support the proposition that persona
is outside the scope of eminent domain. The first is that persona is
“natural property” that by its nature should not be subject to eminent
domain. The second is that persona is a corollary to the fundamental
right of privacy. Either of these arguments is sufficient to prove up
the proposition.
1. NATURAL PROPERTY
As the Constitution creates a conundrum relative to the scope of
eminent domain, it is necessary to explore the scope of eminent domain to determine its limits. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause expressly establishes limitations on eminent domain by restricting the scope of the government’s eminent domain powers to
“private property [] taken for public use . . . .” 245 Nonetheless, over
the years, the Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of what
constitutes “public use.” This expansion of the meaning of public
use has been sharply criticized by constitutional scholars 246 and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (explaining that
although a literal reading of the due process clause might be understood to
regulate the “process” by which the state deprives a person of a protected interest,
the Court has read the clause to contain a “substantive component” for more than
134 years).
244
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
245
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
246
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Epstein on Kelo, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. (June
27, 2005), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/epstein-kelo (“Last week’s regrettable decision in Kelo v. City of New London marks a new low point in the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.”).
243
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rebuked by numerous state governments. 247 However, what is clear
from the Court’s Takings jurisprudence is that the government’s eminent domain power does, in fact, have limits. The question is
whether persona, particularly NIL, is outside of the limits of eminent
domain. This Article posits that it is.
The question is, as the Founders placed strict limits on eminent
domain, is persona outside of those limits? Historically, the Takings
Clause was meant to apply to the government’s taking of real property. 248 Subsequently, most of the takings cases involve the expropriation of the private ownership of real property for a public purpose. 249 For example, following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 250 the
government took several acres of private property in New Orleans,
including homes and businesses in a Mid-City neighborhood, to facilitate the construction of two hospitals. 251 Nonetheless, the
247
See, e.g., Brief of Oklahoma, Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, and Texas as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Cedar Point
Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20–107 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2020) (“The Amici States also want
to protect their own property rights against the federal government. The increasing
power of the federal government will harm state property interests directly if the
federal Takings Clause is unmoored from its traditional roots.”).
248
See William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (“The original
understanding of the Takings Clause was, very simply, that the federal government had to compensate the property owner when it physically took property—
such as when it took land to build a fort. The clause did not require compensation
for regulations under any circumstances.”).
249
See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-domain (last updated
Jan. 24, 2022) (“Properties acquired . . . touch the daily lives of Americans by
housing government services, facilitating transportation infrastructure and national defense and national security installations, and providing recreational opportunities and environmental management areas.”).
250
See generally Hurricane Katrina, BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.
com/event/Hurricane-Katrina (last visited Mar. 5, 2022) (discussing Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath).
251
See Dough Maccash, In Hospital Footprint, Sculptures Recall Lost Neighborhood Demolished after Hurricane Katrina, NOLA (Jan. 14, 2020, 08:30 AM),
https://www.nola.com/entertainment_life/arts/article_4e006e80-2dae-11ea-9afca711259c4d30.html (“The stretch of Mid-City was flooded by the levee failures
following Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Blocks of homes were demolished to make
room for the medical complex[es] . . . . Homeowners were bought out . . . .”). One
of these hospitals was dedicated to serving veterans. See id. (noting the New Orleans Veterans Affairs Medical Center opened in 2016).
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Supreme Court has expanded the understanding of what constitutes
a “taking” over the years to include instances where governmental
regulations negatively impact property rights. 252
Even with this expanded definition of what constitutes a “taking,” some might argue that persona should not be subject to takings
law because it is neither real property, nor a regulatory taking of an
interest in real property. Similarly, others might argue that persona,
particularly NIL, is a type of intellectual property and, therefore,
should not be the subject of a taking; however, there is precedent for
holding that some forms of intellectual property—intangibles including franchises and contracts—can be the subject of a taking. For
example, the City of Oakland, California, claimed that the Oakland
Raiders National League Football team through eminent domain.253
Additionally, in Lynch v. United States, 254 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that valid contracts of the United States are property, and the
rights of private individuals arising out of these valid contracts are
protected by the Fifth Amendment. 255 Thus, persona is not automatically outside of the government’s eminent domain powers simply
because it is intellectual property.
If governmental restrictions on a person’s persona and intellectual property, such as NCAA eligibility rules, are subject to the Takings Clause, is persona an exception to eminent domain? Consistent
with the foundational principles of our democracy, the strongest argument prohibiting the government from “taking” persona rests on
the fact that persona rights are a peculiar type of property. Unlike
the definition of “property” under the Fifth Amendment envisioned
by the Founders, persona rights are not real property; instead, persona is an intrinsic attribute of a human being. As previously discussed, the American Revolution, the Constitution, and the
See generally Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415–16
(1922) (establishing regulatory taking doctrine).
253
See City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60 (1982) (ruled that
summary judgment was not appropriate and remanded the case for a trial on the
merits).
254
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
255
Id. at 579 (“Valid contracts are property . . . . Rights against the United
States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth Amendment . . . . When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between
private individuals.” (citations omitted)).
252
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development of constitutional law evidence the primacy of the protection of human rights from governmental intrusion. 256 The Founders and our jurisprudence also believed in the importance of natural
law and the nature of natural property.
As they reflect the attributes of a person, persona rights are
uniquely “natural property,” 257 which is not “property” in a traditional sense. 258 Throughout our history, natural law has continued to
serve as a guiding, foundational principle that continues as a major
tenet of our belief system. 259 This distinction, between a “natural
property” right and a “positive” 260 or “manmade” 261 property right,
is critical to appreciating the essential nature of a person’s rights to
the attributes of themselves. 262 By adopting Locke’s “natural law”
approach over Bentham’s utilitarian approach, 263 it is clear the
Founders did not envision persona as the kind of property subjected
to eminent domain.
Right of Property posits that the “enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property” is a property right—and thus recognizes that the
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
See “Natural Law,” supra note 59.
258
See “Property,” supra note 69.
259
This is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s 1988 recognition of the importance of natural law’s influence in early U.S. law. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127
U.S. 678, 692 (1888) (stating that the “right to pursue one’s happiness is placed
to the Declaration of Independence among the inalienable rights of man . . . not
by the grace of emperors or kings, or by the force of legislative or constitutional
enactments, but by their Creator . . . .”).
260
See generally Positive Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(in general, the term “positive law” connotes statutory law that has been enacted
by a duly authorized legislature).
261
See Akpotor Eboh, Natural Law and Man-Made Laws: Criticizing the Latter by Appealing to the Former, 4 INT’L J. OF INNOVATIVE HUM. ECOLOGY & NATURE STUDIES 13, 16 (2019) (“Man-made law is law that is made by humans,
usually considered in opposition to concepts like natural or divine law.”).
262
See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111–12 (R. Hildreth trans., 5th ed. 1887) (“Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the
expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand towards it.”).
263
See BENTHAM supra note 262 (providing the most influential utilitarian
justification for private property). Unlike Bentham’s utilitarian justification for
property, Locke’s natural law approach protects the self. See Eboh, supra note
261, at 17 (discussing the “natural right of self-preservation in the natural right of
property.”).
256
257
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enjoyment of persona and protection of property are fundamental.
The relationship between the enjoyment of liberty as a property right
and persona requires some explanation. For example, while the Bill
of Rights focuses primarily on rights that protect individual liberties
during criminal investigations and prosecutions, its underlying principles also protect against the government’s abuse of a person’s civil
rights or liberties.
Furthermore, specific provisions in the Constitution seek to protect citizens’ persona as a property right from state deprivation, via
the use of criminal law and the due process of law. 264 The third
clause of Article I, Section 9 prohibits the federal government from
passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. 265 Similarly, the first
clause of Article I, Section 1 prohibits the state governments from
passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws. 266
Moreover, an analysis of the Bill of Rights shows a very strong
conviction to Right of Property. The First Amendment prohibits the
establishment of religion, 267 and protects against restraints of the
free exercise of religion, abridgment of the freedom of speech, infringement on the freedom of the press, interference with the right
to peaceably assemble, or prohibition of petitioning for a governmental redress of grievances. 268 The Second Amendment provided
citizens the right to personally protect their Right of Property
through the right to keep and bear arms. 269 The Fourth Amendment
guards people’s privacy against wrongful governmental

See Paul Pauker, The Constitution, Deprivation of Life, and Personhood,
AM. THINKER (May 12, 2012), http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2012/
05/the_constitution_deprivation_of_life_and_personhood (“[T]he Constitution
contains two provisions that provide absolute protections of life.”).
265
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed.”).
266
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder
[or] ex post facto Law . . . .”).
267
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
268
Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”).
269
U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
264
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infringement. 270 The Fifth Amendment has two protections of Right
of Property that are strong, definitive statements of libertarian principles: the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause. 271 Most importantly, the Ninth Amendment expressly provides that the enumeration of any rights in the Constitution does not deny or negate
other rights reserved in the people. 272 The Tenth Amendment reserves any powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, as reserved to the states, or respectively to the people. 273 Over
the years, the Supreme Court has found that there are some fundamental, “unenumerated” rights, some of them within the penumbras
of the Constitution, as implied by the Ninth Amendment. 274 Hence,
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, combined with Supreme Court
precedents, support the proposition that the Founders believed in
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”).
271
U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . . .”). The Due Process
clause prohibits the federal government from depriving a person of “life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Id. The Takings Clause prohibits the
federal government from taking private property “for public use, without just
compensation.” Id.
272
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
James Madison proposed the Ninth Amendment to ensure that the enumerated
rights in the Bill of Rights would not be read to preclude the existence of other
rights reserved to the people of the United States. LEGAL INFO. INST., Ninth
Amendment, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/
ninth_amendment (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
273
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
274
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (1964) (“The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.”).
270
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three principles of constitutional power: (1) that all rights not transferred to the government, including the right of self, continue to reside in the people; (2) that additional fundamental rights exist outside of the Constitution; and (3) that the rights enumerated in the
Constitution are not an explicit and exhaustive list of individual
rights. 275
The Founders’ belief in these three principles is evidenced by
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which protects a person’s property from wrongful governmental takings. The Takings
Clause is reinforced by the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against the taking of a person’s liberty and labor by way of enslavement and by the Fourteenth Amendment’s securing of citizenship
rights against all wrongful governmental infringements.
However, the Takings Clause requires the government take private property for “public use” in order to effectuate a “taking” under
the Fifth Amendment. While not impossible to imagine, it is extremely unlikely that the government would have a public need to
take a person’s NIL, with or without just compensation. After a consideration of NIL in the context of the Takings Clause, the case for
prohibiting the government’s taking of other attributes of a person,
such as their labor, brand, or personal identifier, is compelling.
Therefore, because persona is a natural attribute of a person, constitutional principles demand its total protection from governmental
expropriation under the Fifth Amendment.
2. COROLLARY TO PRIVACY AND PERSONALITY RIGHTS
Contrary to the Takings Clause, governmental expropriation of
persona, including NIL, is a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and should be judged under the “strict
scrutiny” lens of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This conclusion is
based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on privacy and personality rights.

275
U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”);
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
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i.
Liberty, Dignity, and Privacy
While the Court has not expressly recognized persona rights, it
has recognized the existence of several rights within the penumbras
of the Constitution that arguably support a right to one’s persona.
For example, the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution recognizes several unenumerated fundamental rights, 276 all of which are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 277 Further,
while the Court has not yet expressly recognized persona, including
NIL, it is arguably encapsulated in previously recognized rights to
personal autonomy, 278 privacy, 279 and informational privacy. 280
The “right to privacy” is often traced to an 1890 article in the
Harvard Law Review authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis. 281 There, Warren and Brandeis recognize the right to

See infra Part II.C.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (discussing
“the sanctity of the family”); There are many other theories regarding what makes
a right “fundamental. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 59 (1980)
(arguing the Court should only recognize non-textual rights that ensure adequate
representation and the effective operation of the political process); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes
on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 284 (1973) (“The Court’s task is to ascertain
the weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law.”). See
generally HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1994) (arguing the Court should use natural law principles to decide
whether a right is fundamental).
278
See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). In Allgeyer, the Court
described due process liberty guarantees in terms of personal autonomy, including
the right “to be free in the enjoyment of all . . . faculties [and] to be free to use
them in all lawful ways . . . .”. Id.
279
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (concluding rights
guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create
“zones of privacy”).
280
But see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (“We are not unaware of
the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amount of personal information . . . nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme . . . evidence[s] a proper
concern with, and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy.”).
281
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 204, at 193 (“That the individual shall
have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common
law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact
nature and extent of such protection.”).
276
277
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privacy as “‘a right to be let alone.’” 282 In addition, Supreme Court
cases have found the right of privacy to be fundamental. For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 283 the Court applied the Due Process
Clause and defined the liberty interest. 284 One commentator has
identified eight broad categories of constitutional analyses where the
Supreme Court has invoked the concept of dignity rather consistently. 285
More to the point, the Court has found that the Constitution safeguards the right of privacy and personal autonomy. 286 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Constitution to protect these rights, specifically in the areas of (1) marriage, (2) procreation, 287 (3) abortion, 288
(4) private consensual homosexual activity, 289 (5) some types of

Id. at 195 (“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing
to the individual . . . the right ‘to be let alone.’” (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF
CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1879))).
283
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
284
Id. (stating that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause “[w]ithout doubt . . . .denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life,
to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
285
See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 789 (2006) (advocating that the Supreme
Court should expressly recognize human dignity as underlying certain constitutional rights).
286
See id.
287
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464−65 (1965) (expanding the scope
of sexual privacy rights to include all procreative sexual intercourse, not just sex
between married partners).
288
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164−65 (1973) (holding that there is a
fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protecting women who wish to terminate their pregnancies, but only
before a fetus is viable outside the womb).
289
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (striking down the criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy in Texas and holding that substantive due
process protects adults’ freedom to engage in consensual sexual acts).
282
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pornography, 290 and (6) medical treatment. 291 For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 292 the state of Connecticut convicted two persons as accessories for giving a married couple information about
birth control and a prescription for a birth control device. 293 There,
the Supreme Court overturned the convictions and found the Connecticut law to be unconstitutional because it violated the right to
privacy in the marital relation, noting that a line of Supreme Court
cases suggests that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, which cover the marital relationship. 294 The right to privacy has justified decisions involving a wide range of civil liberties
cases, including Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 295 which invalidated a
successful 1922 Oregon initiative requiring compulsory public education. 296
As the basis of private tort action, the right to privacy includes
(1) the right of persons to be free from unwarranted publicity, (2)
the right to be free from the unwarranted appropriation of one’s personality, (3) the right to publicize one’s private affairs without a legitimate public concern, and (4) the right to be free from the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities. 297 For example, in 2018,
California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act
(“CCPA”). 298 The CCPA is a privacy law protecting the residents of
California and their personal identifying information. 299 The law enacts regulation over all companies regardless of operational geography protecting the six “intentional acts” included in the law. 300
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (2003) (invalidating state laws
that prohibit the private possession of obscene materials depicting adults over age
18, based on rights granted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
291
See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (holding that
adults have the right to personal autonomy in matters relating to their own medical
care, have the right to refuse medical treatment, which includes life-saving medical treatment, but holding that a state may require clear and convincing evidence
that a person wanted treatment ended before it allows termination).
292
381 U.S 479 (1965).
293
Id. at 480.
294
Id. at 484–85.
295
268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925).
296
Id. at 510.
297
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
298
S.B. 1121, 2018 Legis. Serv., Ch. 735 (Cal. 2018).
299
Id.
300
Id.
290
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Further, some State constitutions afford greater privacy protections
than does the Federal Constitution.301
Hence, based on numerous Supreme Court decisions and recent
statutory developments relating to privacy rights, one may argue that
persona should be protected from governmental intrusion as a corollary to privacy, liberty, and human dignity.
ii.
Personality Rights
While this Article focuses on the limitation on the government’s
use of eminent domain, it is useful to note that the private law has
developed persona protections against private exploitation. Similar
to the law on privacy rights, the law has developed a private right of
action based on the protection of one’s “personality rights.” 302 Personality rights are nearly identical to persona rights. 303
“Personality rights” consist of two types of rights: the right to
privacy and the right of publicity. The right to privacy, which includes protection against misappropriation, is designed to guard individuals’ personal rights against emotional distress. 304
By comparison, the “right of publicity” 305 is a right to legal action designed to protect the names and likenesses of celebrities
Ten states have explicit privacy clauses in their constitutions. See, e.g.,
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (amended 1972) (“The right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without due process
of law.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (listing privacy as an inalienable right granted
to “all people”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from government intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (recognizing a right
to privacy that cannot be infringed “without the showing of a compelling state
interest”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Every person shall find a certain remedy in
the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his . . . privacy . . . .”);
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure . . . against unreasonable . . . invasions of privacy.”).
302
See generally Right of Publicity, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N,
https://www.inta.org/topics/right-of-publicity/ (discussing the right against misappropriation of a person’s name and likeness).
303
See id.
304
Publicity, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/publicity
(last visited Mar. 5, 2022).
305
Federal appeals court Judge Jerome N. Frank coined the. term “the right of
publicity” in the case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
301
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against unauthorized exploitation for commercial purposes. 306 Critics of the right of publicity argue that the concept has been unevenly
applied. 307 Alex Wyman argues that variations in state laws and the
wide variation in their application and interpretation call for a common national standard. 308 On the other hand, Eric E. Johnson argues
that the current doctrine actually embraces at least three different
concepts, “the endorsement right, the merchandizing entitlement,
and the right against virtual impressment.” 309
In the United States, the right of publicity is based on state law
rather than federal law. 310 As such, recognition of the right can vary
from state to state. 311 The rationale underlying the right of publicity
in the United States is rooted in both privacy and economic exploitation. 312 A commonly-cited justification for this doctrine from a
policy standpoint, is the notion of natural rights and the idea that
every individual should have a right to control how their right of
publicity is commercialized by a third party. 313 The right of publicity
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), which recognized a baseball player’s interest in his
photograph on a baseball card. Id. at 868–69. To date, the right of publicity has
been recognized either in state common (judge-made) law or in state statutes, with
more than half the states recognizing the right in one form or another.
306
John. Vile, Right of Publicity, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1011/right-of-publicity (last visited March 5, 2022).
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
See Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Feb. 9, 2022). Indiana has one of the strongest right
of publicity statutes in the U.S., providing recognition of the right for 100 years
after death, and protecting not only a person’s “name, image and likeness,” but
also signatures, photographs, gestures, distinctive appearances, and mannerisms.
See id.
312
Mark Roesler & Garrett Hutchinson, What’s in a Name, Likeness, and Image? The Case for a Federal Right of Publicity Law, A.B.A. (Sept. 16, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/lan
dslide/2020-21/september-october/what-s-in-a-name-likeness-image-case-forfederal-right-of-publicity-law/.
313
Often, although certainly not always, the motivation to engage in such
commercialization is to help propel sales or visibility for a product or service,
which usually amounts to some form of commercial speech, which in turn receives the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
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is defined as the right of all individuals to control commercial use of
their NIL, or other identifying aspects of their identities. 314 In certain
contexts, the right of publicity is limited by the First Amendment.
The right of publicity can be referred to as publicity rights or even
personality rights. 315
Therefore, persona rights, particularly NIL, are a peculiar type
of property that should place them beyond that reach of eminent domain. They are akin to the concept of liberty in that they are “natural
rights,” and are protected by the Court’s privacy jurisprudence. This
raises the follow-up question: If the government’s expropriation of
persona, such as a person’s NIL, is outside the scope of the Takings
Clause, does the Constitution protect a person’s persona from governmental expropriation in other ways?
C.

Due Process

Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought
forth upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in
Liberty . . . that we here highly resolve that these
dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. 316
Assuming that the expropriation of persona rights is outside of
the protection of the Takings Clause, does that mean that the government can freely exploit a person’s NIL without compensation?
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578–79 (1977) (holding that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not immunize the news media from civil liability when they
broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent, and the Constitution does
not prevent a state from requiring broadcasters to compensate performers).
314
Roesler & Hutchinson, supra note 312.
315
See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
316
The “Gettysburg Address” was delivered during the Civil War at the dedication of the Soldiers’ National Cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the
afternoon of November 19, 1863, four and a half months after the Union armies
defeated those of the Confederacy at the Battle of Gettysburg. See an Online Exhibition of The Gettysburg Address, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST.,
https://americanhistory.si.edu/documentsgallery/exhibitions/gettysburg_address
_2.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2022).
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The answer is “no,” because the protection of fundamental rights is
not limited to the Takings Clause. 317 That protection includes both
textual and non-textual sources. 318 One textual source is the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its subsequent jurisprudence. 319
1. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Throughout United States history, we have grappled with when
to apply positive law property rules to exploit people as property. 320
Beginning in 1619, even before the formal creation of the United

See Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (1989).
318
See id. (discussing three alternative sources of nontextual constitutional
rights: history, natural rights, and the evolving consensus of society); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (stating that “the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.’”); see also NORMAN REDLICH, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 322–341, 487–492 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that the Supreme Court has
extended fundamental rights to include the right to interstate travel, the right to
parent one’s own children, protection on the high seas from pirates, the right to
privacy, and the right to marriage); see also How Do the Courts Really Discover
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 813 (1996). Right of Property in one’s
persona as a fundamental right is also evidenced in international human rights
principles and treaties adopted and ratified by the United States. See generally
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC NO. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. Exec. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature
Dec. 21, 1965, S. TREATY DOC NO. 95-18 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212; S.
Treaty Doc. 95-18; 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212.
319
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
320
See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776); see also Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 692 (1888) (recognizing the importance of natural law’s influence in early U.S. law stating that the “right to pursue happiness is
placed by the Declaration of Independence among the inalienable rights of man,
not by the grace of emperors or kings, or by the force of legislative or constitutional enactments, but by the Creator.”).
317
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States, 321 until post-Civil War Reconstruction, 322 the law wrongfully applied the property advantages that derived from a “thing” to
include those derived from the enslavement of human beings,323
based on race. 324
From the inception of the Republic, the Founders were aware of
the inherent contradiction between their belief in libertarianism and
their ownership of people of African descent. 325 For centuries, the
people of the United States benefited from the European, legallysanctioned and religiously-sanctioned enslavement of African people as property. 326 Rather than extend liberty to enslaved people, the
Founders chose to use the Constitution to support the enslavement
of Black people. 327 Developing a prosperous economy built on the
Meilan Solly, 158 Resources to Understand Racism in America, SMITHMAG. (June 4, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/158-resources-understanding-systemic-racism-america-180975029/.
322
See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 125–30 (1956).
323
Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property? in THE
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 105−34 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
324
An ongoing initiative from The New York Times Magazine that began in
August 2019—the 400th anniversary of the beginning of American enslavement—aims to reframe the country’s history by placing the consequences of enslavement and the contributions of Black Americans at the very center of our national narrative). The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG., https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.htmlerica-sla
very.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2022); see also Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as
Property, supra note *.
325
Finkelman, supra note 323, at 103−06.
326
Id.
327
Prior to the Civil War, the Constitution protected the institution of enslavement and did not consider Black people as U.S. citizens. See U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 2, cl. 3. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 protected the legalization of the trade and the
importation of enslaved persons of African descent (stating that “The Migration
and Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2,
cl. 3, or the Fugitive Slave Clause, stated: “No Person held to Service or Labour
in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom Service or Labour may be
due.”
321

SONIAN
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backs and brains of enslaved labor, the Nation found it nearly impossible to reconcile its libertarian principles with its mistreatment
of Black people. 328 Hence, Black people were deemed to be the
property of white enslavers and were not considered U.S. citizens. 329
However, the foundational libertarian principles of liberty and
the natural rights of all people would ultimately win over the nation’s addiction to the power and wealth derived from the enslavement of people of African descent. This formal structure of enslavement, the failure to provide citizenship rights to Black people, 330 and
the battle over the expansion of enslavement into territories 331 resulted in a bloody Civil War between the Confederate insurrectionists and the United States in 1861. 332
Following the United States’ victory over the Confederacy, the
“Reconstruction Amendments” to the Constitution were eventually
enacted, which restated the broad application of the libertarian principles at the core of the American ethos. 333 In 1865, the Thirteenth
Amendment sought to guarantee that the persona rights—particularly the right of self-determination and the right to labor—of every
American would be protected from most, although not all, forms of
private and public exploitation. 334 It formally abolished the de jure
institution of slavery. 335 However, through the criminal due process

Finkelman, supra note 323, at 180−82.
See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 590 (1857) (holding that the Constitution was not meant to include American citizenship for people of African descent,
regardless of whether they were enslaved or free, and thus, the rights and privileges that the Constitution confers upon American citizens could not apply to people of African descent).
330
Id.
331
Civil War, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war/
american-civil-war-history#:~:text=The%20Civil%20War%20in%20the%20Uni
ted%20States%20began,of%20America%3B%20four%20more%20states%20so
on%20joined%20them (last visited Feb. 12, 2022).
332
Id.
333
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
334
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (stating “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
335
Id.
328
329
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exception in the Thirteenth Amendment, 336 the government permitted private and public mistreatment of people as state property. 337
As the Confederate leadership regained power in the South,
southern legislatures enacted “black codes”—state-sanctioned, racially-based rules and restrictions on the lives, liberty, and property
rights of Black people. 338 In direct response to the black codes, the
nation adopted two additional constitutional amendments granting
citizenship rights 339 to newly-freed Black people and voting rights
to Black males, respectively. 340 The federal government’s protection of Black people and their rights was short lived. 341 Following
Reconstruction and the restoration of southern white supremacy, 342
the Supreme Court diminished the protective impact of the Fourteenth Amendment, 343 again exposing Black lives to renewed exploitation, oppression, and abuses.
After nearly another century of racial abuse and inequality, in
1954, the Supreme Court issued the landmark decision of Brown v.

336

Id.
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); see also 13TH (Kandoo Films
2016).
338
See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE
RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR
II (2008).
339
Id. at 52.
340
Id.
341
See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL
RIGHTS YEARS, 1954–1965 (1987) (documenting the Black struggle for civil
rights).
342
Id.
343
See, e.g., the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81–82 (1872) (limiting
Fourteenth Amendment’s application Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
to federal rights, such as the right to interstate travel, but not “state rights” such
as intra-state travel); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552−53 (1875)
(limiting Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability to state governments when white
mob killed one hundred Black people but nevertheless evaded criminal punishment). However, in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began a series of decisions that
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to “incorporate” most portions of the Bill
of Rights, making these portions, for the first time, enforceable against the State
governments. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (expressly
holding that States were bound to protect freedom of speech).
337
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Board of Education. 344 That case held that racially segregated public
schools were unconstitutional. 345 This decision restored the nation’s
commitment to applying our founding libertarian principles to Black
people. Consequently, Black people believed that the federal government and the courts would once again be allies in their struggle
for equal justice. 346
In the 1960s, Black people advocated for their constitutional
rights through peaceful civil rights protests, marches, and sit-ins,347
resulting in President Lyndon B. Johnson signing into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 348 Hence, the federal government has both a
constitutional and a statutory duty to protect Black people’s right to
be free from expropriation. The law provides federal courts with the
jurisdiction to protect Black lives, recognizing that throughout our
history, Black people have been particularly vulnerable to governmental abuse and should be afforded special, federal protection. 349
Yet, even today, there is no federal statute that expressly prohibits
the expropriation of Right of Property for Black people. This is particularly troublesome for those student athletes who play for NCAA
teams and yet fail to see the fruits of their labor, as many of them
struggle to afford basic necessities.
As reflected in the Black struggle for equality in America, constitutional law continues to develop in a manner that seeks to ensure
the fulfillment of our libertarian vision of individual rights under the
law. Today, the Constitution expressly provides this protection in
the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of enslavement of people,
347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (ruling that state laws establishing racial segregation in public schools are unconstitutional, even if the segregated schools are otherwise equal
in quality). This was followed by decades of the battle of the desegregation of
public schools, including universities. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 17 (1990) (documenting the role federal circuit court judges played in the
implementation of the Brown decision).
345
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
346
BASS, supra note 344, at 17.
347
See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/civil-rights-act (last updated Jan. 20, 2022).
348
U.S. federal anti-discrimination law protects groups of people with common characteristics from discrimination on the basis of those characteristics,
which include race, color, religion, national origin, and other such categories. See
generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
349
See WILLIAMS, supra note 341, at 17.
344
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protecting the person and their labor, 350 and the citizenship rights
expressly provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment. 351 Moreover,
the Constitution provides additional protections in the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 352 and in the reservation of rights
to the individual pursuant to the Ninth Amendment. 353 Hence, there
are strong constitutional provisions that functionally recognize and
protect the persona rights of individuals, which includes those of
Black people.
As the Fourteenth Amendment expressly grants Congress the
authority to guarantee the effectiveness of that Amendment, Congress is authorized to enact protections for persona rights. 354 Therefore, Congress has a constitutional mandate to enact laws that protect personal liberties from governmental and private exploitation.
2. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Another argument supporting the proposition that persona is
protected against government exploitation is the Supreme Court’s
expansion of the rights it deems to be fundamental. Since 1925, the
Court has expanded the number of unenumerated or fundamental
rights and civil liberties that protect individuals against federal and
state infringements. 355 To determine whether an unenumerated right
is fundamental, the Court looks to “history, legal traditions, and
practices [to] provide the crucial guideposts for responsible decision
making.” 356 As previously discussed, persona embodies the
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
352
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (emphasis added)).
353
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
354
See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
355
See Gitlow v. People, 268 U.S. 652, 652 (1925) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment extended the First Amendment’s
provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press to apply to the
governments of U.S. states).
356
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[W]e ‘ha[ve]
always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended.’”) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
350
351
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foundational, libertarian principles found in the Bill of Rights and in
the Reconstruction Amendments. 357
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 358 The fundamental liberties protected by
this Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.359 In addition, these liberties extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. 360 The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of
the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility,
however, “has not been reduced to any formula.” 361 Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests
of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them their
respect. 362 That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analyses of other constitutional provisions that set
forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and
tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer
boundaries. 363 That method respects our history, and learns from it,
without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
In 2015, in the landmark case of Obergefell v. Hodges, 364 the
Supreme Court formulated a test for determining whether a right is
fundamental. 365 In that case, the Court identified “four principles
See supra Section III.A.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
359
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
360
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1965); see also Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
361
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
362
See id.
363
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
364
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015) (holding that fundamental
right to marry applies “with equal force to same-sex couples”).
365
See id. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fundamental liberties protected by this
Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). In addition, these liberties extend to certain
personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate
choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
357
358
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and traditions [that] demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex
couples.” 366 While two of these principles are specific to marriage,
two are not. The Court provided a two-prong test to determine
whether persona rights are fundamental: (1) are persona rights inherent in the concept of individual autonomy; and (2) are persona
rights a keystone of our social order? 367 The answer to both questions is “yes.”
As noted previously in Section II.A, persona is synonymous
with personal liberty, which is the cornerstone of our social order, is
inherent to our concept of individual autonomy, and underlies our
culture and traditions. In addition to the express provisions in the
Constitution protecting Right to Property, the Supreme Court has
also recognized personal liberty in several key cases. Thus, the
Court reiterated a substantive due process aspect of persona inherent
in the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that its prior cases held
that the amendment guarantees “more than fair process,” to include
a “substantive sphere” which bars “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.” 368
As presented above, the protection of persona against state infringement meets the Supreme Court’s criteria for what constitutes
a fundamental right, as established in Obergefell and other key fundamental rights decisions.

U.S. 438, 453 (1965); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86
(1965). The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part
of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however,
“has not been reduced to any formula.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment
in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord
them their respect. See id. That process is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analyses of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad
principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. See Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). That method respects our history and learns from it
without allowing the past alone to rule the present.
366
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665, 669.
367
Id.
368
Id. at 438-429.

728

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

3. STRICT SCRUTINY
Furthermore, because the Court has adopted strict scrutiny analysis in cases where governmental action wrongfully infringes on
persona in the name of liberty, any governmental action that wrongfully infringes on a persona right is suspect. 369 Hence, any governmental expropriation of personal rights must be viewed from a strict
scrutiny standard of review, due to its status as a fundamental right.
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 370 the Court articulated a two-step
test on how to protect fundamental rights: (1) the Due Process
Clause “specially” protects rights and liberties deeply rooted in tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; and (2) a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest is required.” 371 The Glucksberg Court also acknowledged a line of cases
which applied heightened scrutiny while invoking either fundamental rights or liberty interests. 372 It concluded “[t]he ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . may
not be interfered with [by] legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the state to affect . . . the individual has certain fundamental rights
which must be respected. 373
Hence, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides a meaningful alternative to the Takings Clause when it comes
to analyzing the limitations on the government’s power of eminent
domain. It also provides both a judicial basis for assessing the exploitation of individual rights outside the Takings Clause, and arguably provides for more remedies, and more comprehensive compensation, than does the “just compensation” provision of the Fifth
Amendment. 374
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703, 721 (1997).
Id. at 703.
371
Id. at 721.
372
See id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 464-65 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S 479, 503−04, 511 (1965); Skinner
v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of the
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534−36 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 399−400,
403 (1923)).
373
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 400, 401 (1923).
374
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
369
370
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In summary, there are three reasons why the government should
not be permitted to expropriate persona. First, persona embraces
foundational, libertarian principles that place the right of the individual over the whims of the government. 375 Second, persona, particularly NIL, is a peculiar type of property—“natural property”—
that should never be the subject of “public purpose.” Third, the governmental exploitation of persona is a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This violation should be
judged under the “strict scrutiny” lens and should be adequately—
not “justly”—compensated.
Relative to the particular case of the NCAA and its government
partners’ expropriation of college athletes’ persona, including their
NIL, such wrongful behavior must be stopped and the harm redressed. The reasons are clear: (1) NCAA students’ NIL rights, and
other persona rights, should not be subject to eminent domain; (2)
the students’ rights should never be taken for public purpose; and
(3) such expropriation stifles the development of a billion-dollar industry and denies these players the opportunity to acquire wealth. 376
Failing to take action means that collegiate athletes will continue to
be uncompensated for the expropriation of their NIL, some of them
will continue to live on college campuses in poverty, and the Nation
will continue to face the moral disgrace of the compensation inequity between players and the NCAA executives and coaches.
III.
THE PERSONA PROTECTION ACT 377
Recognizing a dire need to protect persona, including NIL, from
governmental overreach, Part III provides a proposed code in the
See Nimmer, supra note 315, at 215–16.
Paying College Athletes—Top 3 Pros and Cons, PROCON.ORG (Jan., 21,
2022),
https://www.procon.org/headlines/paying-college-athletes-top-3-prosand-cons/ (finding that “[t]he player-level analysis reveals that the existing limits
on player compensation effectively transfers resources away from students who
are more likely to be black and more likely to come from poor neighborhoods
towards students who are more likely to be white and come from higher-income
neighborhoods.”).
377
This Act benefited from the Senate bill, Players Bill of Rights, and ABA
proposal, the right of publicity, right of personality, personality. See generally
Booker, Senators Announce College Athletes Bill of Rights, CORY BOOKER (Aug.
375
376
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form of a federal legislative solution. The following shows how such
federal legislation would apply to the NCAA players controversy,
responds to critiques of the proposed legislation, and proposes reparations as the equitable remedy.
A. Solution
In response to the problem of the private property-eminent domain conundrum, it is imperative to protect the expectation of the
natural property rights of persona from governmental expropriation.
The “Persona Protection Act (“PPA”) is the proposed solution to the
questions remaining after the Alston decision and numerous state
laws dealing with protecting NIL from governmental takings. This
legislation reflects the normative claim that every person in this
country has the constitutional right to be free from government control over one’s persona. 378 Additionally, the Act provides legal and
equitable remedies if the government does, in fact, expropriate one’s
persona. 379 These remedies are broader and more equitable than the
“just compensation” that is provided by the Takings Clause. 380 The
specific provisions of PPA follow the main text of this Article as an
Appendix. Three tenets reflected in the provisions of the PPA are as
follows:
First, PPA recognizes that by enacting the Takings Clause in the
Fifth Amendment, the Founders indirectly adopted the principle of
eminent domain by which the government has the power to take private property for public purposes. Additionally, PPA recognizes the
Takings Clause expressly restricts the government’s eminent domain powers to takings for public purposes and subject to just compensation.

13, 2020), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-senators-announ
ce-college-athletes-bill-of-rights; Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, ABA (Aug. 1, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/communications_la
wyer/august2011/why_federal_right_publicity_statute_is_necessary_comm_law
_28_2.pdf.
378
See Joondeph, supra note 205, at 541.
379
As both the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment expressly
grant Congress the authority to guarantee their effectiveness is authorized to enact
the PPA. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 2; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
380
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Second, notwithstanding the constitutional restrictions on eminent domain, PPA recognizes that the government, both at the state
and federal levels, has wrongfully expropriated—and continues to
wrongfully expropriate—people’s persona, or the virtual attributes
of oneself. Particularly, through the use of the NCAA, which the
government has granted tax-preferred, non-profit status, state and
local governments, especially those that own and operate NCAA
member schools, have robbed its member athletes of their persona
rights, including the right to capitalize on their NIL. This exploitation has been both direct and indirect. Governments have directly
exploited members by exploiting players’ labor. Governments have
indirectly exploited members through the NCAA’s eligibility rules.
Following the Alston decision, and state laws prohibiting such exploitation, there is an obvious need to address this issue broadly.
Third, PPA seeks to broadly address the need to absolutely prohibit the government’s eminent domain powers from applying, directly or indirectly, to the past, present, and future expropriation of
persona, particularly, but not limited to NIL. In further response to
this situation, PPA seeks to remedy past, present, and future expropriation of persona by providing all legal, equitable, and special
(such as punitive damages) remedies, beyond and not limited to
“just compensation.” These remedies include the use of injunctive
relief and constructive trusts (including a Victims’ Compensation
Fund), as well as the right to pursue claims under the Due Process
Clause.
In conclusion, PPA provides a transformative solution: the absolute ban on the application of eminent domain to persona rights.
PPA constitutes a win-win, as it protects the privacy of individuals
while providing clear guidance to the government which avoids
needless litigation. This change will deliver both justice and peace
of mind for owners of persona rights.
B. Application
The ultimate goal of PPA is to protect the persona rights of every
American, not only NCAA players. However, it is useful to show
how PPA would address the current debate over NCAA athletes’
right to their NIL. When we apply PPA to the “pay-to-play” issue,
the practical challenge is attracting more support for state or federal
legislation embracing PPA. A federal PPA would address several of
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the problems that were identified in the case study of the NCAA
players’ battle over their NIL, 381 including a lack of uniformity, an
unequal playing field, and the obstacles of developing a national media market for NIL. While a federal solution might be ideal, it is
equally plausible for PPA to be the subject of state referendum, state
legislation, or judicial action. However, there are several advantages
to enacting a federal statute.
First, a federal PPA would add uniformity to the law on players’
NIL rights. There is a lack of uniformity in the current laws as several, but not all, 382 states have passed Fair-Pay-to-Play (“Fair Play”)
laws. 383 This raises two sets of problems: those that relate to how
each Fair Play law compares to one another, and those that relate to
how the law in a Fair Play state compares to and applies in a state
that has not yet enacted Fair Play laws. In regard to the first problem,
varying State laws interpreted by their respective state courts will
likely produce different rules which might create inequities. The
second problem, one of comity, raises the difficulties when an athlete enrolled in a Fair Play school plays in a game hosted by and
located in a non-Fair Play state. A federal PPA would address these
problems by providing a single, superseding body of rules that
would make for a better, more predictable operation of college
sports.
Second, a federal PPA would level the playing field from state
to state. Currently, there are more states that have not enacted Fair
Play law than states that have enacted such laws. 384 This causes a
problem of fair competition in recruiting players, giving Fair Play
schools a competitive edge over non-Fair Play schools. The most
sought-after players would gravitate toward a NCAA school in that
state that allows that player to compensation for their NIL. As a result, schools in Fair Play States would have a major competitive advantage over schools in non-Fair Play States. Not only would this
create powerhouse teams, but it would also weaken the attraction of
college sports as the competition would be lopsided. Moreover, as
See infra Part I.
Andrew Smalley, Student-Athlete ‘Pay for Play’ Gets Lawmakers’ Attention, NCSL (May 24, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/studentathlete-pay-to-play-gets-lawmakers-attention-magazine2021.aspx.
383
Id.
384
Id.
381
382
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successful college sports teams drive revenue in many forms, including media, advertising, ticket sales, and increased student enrollment, Fair Play schools would receive an increase in financial
benefits. This problem is aggravated by the NCAA interim rules relating to NIL, which narrowly applies if a student plays for a school
that is located in a state that has enacted a Fair Play law.
Third, a federal PPA would facilitate and promote an orderly
market for college athletes’ NIL because that market is a national
one, involving interstate commerce under federal jurisdiction. Because media is interstate, sports are played in various states, and
players are required to cross state boundaries, the federal government has jurisdiction over college sports. 385 Moreover, it is incumbent on the federal government to protect and defend the NIL rights
of college athletes. The enactment of a federal PPA would spell out
this fact and would clarify issues including enforceability, fines and
penalties for noncompliance, retroactivity, defeasibility, and other
details. Most importantly, a federal PPA would mean that players
would be entitled to their NIL as a matter of right rather than as a
privilege granted by the NCAA and certain state governments,
which would advance the concept of persona as a universal right,
protected against all wrongful exploitation.
Hence, the enactment of a federal PPA, relative to the pay-toplay issue, would address the issues of uniformity, an unequal playing field, and the development of a national media market for NIL.
A federal PPA would declare that college athletes have a right to
their NIL and would protect that right against wrongful private and
public exploitation. In doing so, a federal PPA would preempt both
inconsistent state Fair Play laws and NCAA amateurism rules, promote the vitality of college sports by ensuring a level playing field,
and enhance the value of NIL by protecting its national marketability. Furthermore, this development would add permanency and stability to such a right and promote a strong, lasting market for all
attributes of persona from which every American can enjoy and financially benefit.

LEGAL INFO. INST., Sports Law, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sports_law (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
385
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C. Critiques
This section briefly responds to several arguments against PPA
as a proposed solution to the need to restrict the government’s power
of eminent domain. Each critique is accompanied by a response,
which argues that the benefits of PPA outweigh its possible shortcomings.
First, some critics of PPA might argue that it is flawed because
it is based on the premise that if persona is a right, it cannot be voluntarily contracted away or waived, which is what the college athletes agree to do when they agree to play for a NCAA team. 386 In
response to this critique, this Article posits that as a personal right,
persona is alienable by its owner to another person or entity. Moreover, it concedes that a player has a choice to play for a NCAA team
and derives a substantial increase in the value of its brand as a result
of doing so. However, it contends that the NCAA rules are overbearing and does not allow for fair and open negotiation, and competition for a player’s talent; and therefore, is a wrongful expropriation by government.
Second, some critics of PPA might argue that its enactment
would destroy college athletics by turning it into a highly competitive, uncongenial activity, which is unbecoming of college life.
There is no reason to believe this would be the outcome of the abolition of the amateurism rules. The abandonment of a similar amateurism rule in the Olympic Games shows that this is unlikely to be
the case. 387 There, Olympic athletes are reasonably competitive;
however, they are still collegial. Moreover, this critique is flawed
because the coaches of NCAA member schools are often highly
compensated as professionals. 388 That has not resulted in unprofessional behavior. Furthermore, following the enactment of PPA, college athletes would be permitted to hire professional agents, which
would result in an increase in the earning opportunities for all athletes.

See Victoria L. Jackson, Opinion: It’s Time to End the Notion of NCAA
Amateurism, GLOBAL SPORT MATTERS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://globalsport
matters.com/culture/2018/04/10/opinion-its-time-to-end-the-notion-of-ncaa-amateurism/.
387
Id.
388
Id.
386
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Third, some critics might argue that the government’s eminent
domain powers allow it to take intellectual property for a public purpose with just compensation. In the case of the NCAA, if it was determined to be a governmental entity or that its rule constitute a taking, the players are justly compensated for waiving their NIL rights.
This compensation comes in both direct and indirect forms and is
invaluable. In addition to a free education and room and board, the
players receive the benefit of the status of playing on an NCAA
team, including media exposure. Moreover, in the case of the
NCAA, critics might argue that there is no taking because the players have consented by waiving their NIL rights. In response, as to
the consent issue, it is clear that the NCAA and its players have unequal bargaining positions. 389 Furthermore, in light of the enormous
financial benefits the NCAA and its members receive, the compensation given to the players is anything but fair. Others would argue
that PPA wrongfully deprives state legislatures of the power to determine the property rights of college athletes in their states. I argue
that these state governments are currently benefiting from the
wrongful expropriation of the property rights of college athletes, and
therefore, are conflicted from making such a determination.
Therefore, PPA embodies both constitutional principles and
good public policy. Contrary to the views of many critics, PPA will
not result in a less collegial environment on college campuses. PPA
does not mean that persona rights are inalienable; rather, PPA places
the value of persona in the hands of the person whose NIL is being
commercially used. Neither of those critiques negates the positive
impact of PPA in recognizing and protecting the NIL and persona
rights of all people who live in the U.S. Furthermore, prohibiting the
government from using eminent domain relative to persona will
likely promote a greater and richer marketplace for virtual assets,
which will enhance the income and wealth of its owners, who may
include young people who are socially and economically disadvantaged.

Moreover, there is the question of whether NCAA athletes, some of whom
are minors, have the legal capacity, let along the emotional maturity, to contract
away their rights.
389
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D. Reparations
Hence, one might conclude that the government, at all levels,
directly and in agency or partnership with the NCAA, has wrongfully exercised its eminent domain power over the property rights of
college athletes and without just compensation. If one accepts such
an obvious, yet un-litigated, conclusion, what is the appropriate remedy for such infringements on the players’ rights? NCAA athletes
are at the mercy of the government to provide adequate, meaningful
remedial relief to athletes. Moreover, the remedy for a taking is just
compensation, which is woefully inadequate and does not address
the punitive nature of the exploitation.
Therefore, this Article recommends a more equitable remedy is
in the form of reparations—that is, a “Student Athlete Victims’
Compensation Fund.” Such a fund would compensate present and
former players, as well as remediate the negative effects of current
and past expropriation of the players’ persona. Such remedies
should include damages to the players themselves, their families,
and their communities. Reparations should aggressively erase the
direct and collateral effects of the wrongful expropriations. However, some critics might argue that a victims’ reparations fund is too
expensive to implement and will destroy college football.
Returning to the libertarian thesis of this Article, the Alston case
evidences that libertarianism—the recognition and protection of the
right of self—is present in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. However, it is just barely present. While Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh are the most libertarian-leaning justices on the Court today,
they are far from truly embracing a Right of Property in oneself, as
advanced in Alston. If those Justices were true libertarians, they
would have recognized the players’ rights to their persona, including
to their NIL, and the fundamental right to its protection against present and future private and governmental exploitation. Accordingly,
the Justices would have awarded the students remediation for the
past takings of their property rights. Consequently, we need a robust
conversation on the status of our fundamental rights, and
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particularly the role of the federal courts in protecting those rights
against eminent domain within our federalist system of government. 390
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is an anti-libertarian concept that violates the
most basic and sacred of our fundamental rights—private property
ownership. This Article posits that persona, which includes NIL, is
an inherent “natural” property right that every person in the U.S.
possesses and which is beyond the reach of the government’s eminent domain powers. Further, it concludes that any governmental
expropriation of persona is subject to Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process protections.
The NCAA college athletes’ battle for control of their NIL is on
the front lines of this important issue. State laws recognizing NCAA
players’ NIL rights provide a foundation for protecting those rights
for everyone, not just NCAA athletes. To protect those rights from
governmental takings, this Article offers a legislative solution which
prohibits the government from expropriating persona.
It is time for the next generation of law students and lawyers to
revise the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, to conclude that the life
of the law was, and is, the constant pursuit of justice and protection
of individual rights from wrongful expropriations by the government.

See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp 556, 558 (E.D. La.
1964), rev’d. 380 U.S. 479, 559 (1965) (involving a civil rights criminal prosecution regarding segregation activities). Judge John Minor Wisdom, dissenting, argues: “[T]he crowning glory of American federalism . . . is the protection the
United States Constitution gives to the private citizen against all wrongful governmental invasion of fundamental rights and freedoms . . . it makes federalism
workable.” Id. at 570–71 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
390
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APPENDIX
Part III of this Article introduces the three tenets of the Persona
Protection Act. 391 The following provides the specific provisions of
the Act.
A.
Preamble
There is an inherent Right of Property in which every American
possesses and controls the attributes of self as a property right. The
“Persona Protection Act” (“PPA”) is the proposed code that would
guide government and policymakers to identify and enforce the prohibition of the government’s exercise of eminent domain to exploit
virtual aspects of a person’s self, particularly their NIL, referred to
herein and defined as “persona.” 392 Additionally, PPA provides legal and equitable remedies for the wrongful exploitation of persona. 393
This Act recognizes that the right of private property is one of
the cornerstones of our democracy. It is a fundamental belief of the
Founders and is embodied in both the Declaration of Independence
and the Bill of Rights. Despite its abuse in the ownership of people
of African descent, the Right of Property was reiterated and expanded in the Reconstruction Amendments. In accordance with the
Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, all rights not expressly
superseded by the federal or state governments are reserved to the
people.
However, in the Fifth Amendment, the Founders intentionally,
or unintentionally, recognized the government’s eminent domain
over private property, albeit for limited public purpose. This created
a conundrum of the extent to which eminent domain applies to private property.
To protect Right of Property, this Act provides that the government be prohibited from exploiting its eminent domain power to expropriate one’s persona. Further, any such exploitation shall not be
governed by the Fifth Amendment. Instead, any such exploitation is
a violation of this Act, and shall be measured by strict scrutiny as a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
391
392
393

See supra Part III.
See “Persona,” supra note 32.
See supra note 379.
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Furthermore, this Act recognizes that the natural rights theory of
property, as embodied in The Declaration of Independence and in
the U.S. Constitution, embraces the fundamental principle that we
are all endowed with certain natural or God-given rights that are inalienable. This right encompasses the possession and control of the
virtual attributes of self, including one’s name, image, and likeness.
Moreover, this Act seeks to protect people, particularly minors
of color from disadvantaged communities, from exploitation of their
virtual selves, by granting legal and equitable remedies to victims of
such exploitation. Those remedies shall include injunctive relief and
constructive trusts, as well as compensatory and punitive damages,
including private, governmental, and governmental-sponsored expropriation. 394
Additionally, this Act seeks to remedy past, present, and future
expropriation of Right of Property by providing remedial solutions
to the past exploitation and expropriation of the virtual aspects of
self, by intentionally providing compensation and reparations for
past and current exploitation, such as that of NCAA college athletes,
through the establishment of a Victims’ Compensation Fund. It is
expected that this Act will guide society, corporations, and government to avoid needless, costly litigation. This change will deliver
both justice and peace of mind for those who wish and/or need to
protect their persona from governmental expropriation.
B.
The Provisions
Whereas, the right to persona is fundamental and should be constitutionally protected against direct and indirect private, industry,
and governmental exploitation of self;
Whereas, the federal government, via its non-profit status
granted to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”),
have taken and continues to expropriate the rights of college athletes
without impunity and without just compensation;
Whereas, State governments, particularly those NCAA members, have and continue to receive huge direct and indirect revenue
and other benefits from their wrongful taking of college athletes’
rights;
See supra note 390; Ilya Somin, Libertarianism and Federalism, 751
CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1−2 (2014).
394
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Whereas, the NCAA’s amateurism rule diminishes the value of
attributes of college athletes, by monopolizing its development in an
anticompetitive environment;
Whereas, recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in a unanimous decision, signaled to the NCAA that the growing view that its amateurism rules are unfair;
Whereas, several States have passed legislation seeking to protect college athletes’ NIL rights;
Whereas, while NIL rights represent millions of dollars in potential compensation to a selective few, high profile NCAA college
athletes, the NCAA and its members will continue to keep and continue to generate billions of dollars from the labor of its athletes;
Whereas, the current discussion about easing the restrictions on
NCAA college athletes’ NIL fails to ensure the property rights of
those athletes, as they represent privileges under the control of the
NCAA;
Whereas, the legal analysis of the NCAA’s amateurism rules focuses on questions of antitrust rules, athlete compensation, and
equal treatment compared to non-athlete college students. While
these legal lenses are important, they fail to provide college athletes,
many of whom are racial minorities from underprivileged communities, any meaningful remedies for their mistreatment and inferior
status.
Whereas, those analytical lenses fail to create an effective, transformative narrative that would free college athletes, some of whom
are legal minors, from economic exploitation and the lack of human
dignity they suffer (and have suffered) by being treated as the property of the NCAA and its member schools. Hence, even in the face
of reform, college athletes are left seeking a handout from their exploiters, rather than being empowered by a constitutional right to
own and control the attributes of their self;
Whereas, without a rights-based analysis of relationships between parties, the powerful are consciously or unconsciously allowed to exploit the political, economic underdogs, particularly
Black people. The benefits that the underdogs receive are “privileges” granted to them by the powerful, and not rights guaranteed to
them by the Constitution;
Therefore, It Is Hereby Pronounced that PPA provides the following:
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(1) PPA recognizes that the natural rights theory of property, as
embodied in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution and embraces the fundamental principle that we are all endowed
with certain natural or God-given rights that are inalienable, including labor, NIL, and virtual attributes.
(2) PPA’s primary goal is the end of private, industry, and governmental exploitation of attributes of a person’s self, by banning
their authority to so, and by granting those being exploited with special legal and equitable remedies including the use of injunctive relief and constructive trusts, to protect the owner for the present and
future wrongful taking of oneself.
(3) PPA seeks to remedy past, present, and future expropriation
of self by intentionally providing compensation and reparations of
the past and current takings of attributes of self of all Americans,
particularly NCAA college athletes.
(4) All levels and branches of government, to the highest extent
of their powers and authorities, are hereby mandated to abolish all
direct or indirect taking of self. This mandate is self-evident and
does not require supplemental action other than the immediate endeavors needed to facilitate these requisites.
(5) The Justice Department is hereby authorized to investigate
alleged incidents of such expropriations.
(6) PPA shall be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The legal
standard for assessing liability shall be whether the government or
its agents are, or have taken, attributes of self puts the burden on the
government as a fiduciary of self.
(7) Any such past expropriation, exploitation, use, and infringement on attributes of self shall be enjoined from the adoption of this
Act, and that such abuses be retroactively compensated to the full
extent of the current market value of the abuse.
(8) PPA establishes a Victims’ Compensation Fund to redress
the past and present wrongful governmental taking of people’s persona rights, particularly of NCAA players, their families, and their
communities.

